The WTO and Development Policy Space in India by Mate, Manoj
Article
TheWTO and Development Policy Space in India
Manoj Mate†
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................285
II. THEWTO ANDDEVELOPMENT POLICY SPACE: THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ..........................290
A. Perspectives on International Trade Law and Policy Space............................................292
B. International Trade Law and Approaches to Conceptualizing Policy Space ..................294
1. Legal Approaches.........................................................................................................294
2. Institutional Approaches ..............................................................................................296
3. Compliance Approaches ..............................................................................................297
C. Conceptualizing Policy Space: Policy Implementation and Policy Regimes..................298
III. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN INDIA..............................................300
A. Indian Industrial Policy: From Liberalization to the New Industrial Policy ...................300
B. India’s Earlier Approach to WTO Adjudication .............................................................302
C. India-Solar Cells and Solar Industrial Policy ..................................................................304
D. India-Export Related Measures and India’s Special Economic Zones Policy ................314
IV. COMPARING POLICY REGIMES: INDIA-SOLAR CELLS, INDIA-EXPORT RELATEDMEASURES .....321
A. Legal Flexibility and Domestic Policy Regimes .............................................................322
B. Legal and Policy Compliance Strategies .........................................................................326
C. Policy Implementation and Adaptation ...........................................................................327
1. Policy Viability, Political Will, and Conflicting Versus Complementary Goals.........328
2. Nature and Scope of Industrial Sector..........................................................................330
3. Transitions in Industrial Policy ....................................................................................331
V. CONCLUSION................................................................................................................................332
I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization and trade continue to pose significant challenges for
economic and industrial development in both developed and developing
nations. Critics of globalization have highlighted its negative consequences for
increasing economic inequality, capital migration, and loss of industrial jobs to
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other nations.1 Over the past decade, these dynamics have arguably fueled
nationalist populist movements that have given rise to Brexit in the European
Union, the election of Donald Trump, and rising nationalism and protectionism
in other nations.2 These trends reflect growing discontent with globalization
and the economic dislocation it has caused for industrial workers and broader
domestic concerns about how the international economic order privileges
globalization over national interests and sovereignty. In particular, the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and international trade law regime continue to pose
significant challenges for developing nations’ policy autonomy to pursue a
variety of development strategies and presents challenges for development,
national sovereignty, and democracy.3
Current shifts in global trade policy now present new challenges for
developing nations. Over the past two years, the Trump administration has
signaled a more aggressive protectionist approach on global trade and has also
pursued rigorous enforcement of international trade law through a series of
challenges to industrial and trade policies in China, India, and other developing
nations.4 In just the last two years alone, the United States has aggressively
challenged India’s policies at the WTO, including the first ever counter-
notification challenging India’s minimum price supports in the agricultural
sector before the Agriculture Committee,5 ongoing claims of noncompliance
with the WTO Appellate Body’s report in India-Solar Cells,6 and challenges to
1 See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, HASGLOBALIZATIONGONE TOO FAR (1997) (analyzing adverse effects of
globalization on social stability across nations, and on autonomy of nations to pursue industrial
development policies); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITSDISCONTENTS (2003) (critiquing
neoliberal policies advanced by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade
Organization and negative consequences of globalization for development).
2 See Gregory Shaffer, How Do We Get Along? International Economic Law and the Nation-State, 117
MICH. L. REV. 1229 (2019) (reviewing DANI RODRIK, STRAIGHT TALK ON TRADE: IDEAS FOR A SANE
WORLD ECONOMY (2018) and arguing that international economic law needs to better accommodate
national policy space and complement and support domestic policy options and domestic institutions).
3 See, e.g. DANI RODRIK, STRAIGHT TALK ON TRADE: IDEAS FOR A SANEWORLD ECONOMY (2018)
(arguing for the need for a better balance between globalization and national development in
international economic law); SONIA E. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENT AT THEWORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION 74-93 (2012) (discussing debates on development during Uruguay Round and the extent
to which the WTO has integrated development goals and interests of developing nations); STIGLITZ,
supra note 1 (discussing failure of international economic institutions to consider negative effects of
globalization on developing nations); DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THEWTO LEGAL SYSTEM (Chantal
Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009) (discussing how WTO accommodates development goals).
4 See Shaffer, supra note 2, at 1248 n.101 (discussing divergence between U.S. attack on international
trade law and the WTO, and China and India’s increasing support and defense of the WTO).
5 See Communication from the U.S. Pursuant to Article 18.7 of the Agreement on Agriculture, Certain
Measures of India Providing Market Price Support to Rice and Wheat, ¶¶ 2.1, 4.16, WTO Doc.
G/AG/W/174 (May 9, 2018) (presenting data that the United States claims shows that India’s market
price support for wheat and rice is significantly higher than what India has reported to the WTO); Points
Raised by Members Under the Review Process: Compilation of Questions for the Meeting on 11-12
June 2018, WTO Doc. G/AG/W/178/Corr.1 (June 6, 2018) (counter-notification suggesting that India
substantially underreported its market price support (MPS) for wheat and rice in India’s 2010-11 and
2013-14 notifications to the WTO).
6 Recourse to Article 22.2 of the DSU by the United States, India-Certain Measures Related to Solar
Cells and Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/18 (Dec. 19, 2017) (United States “request for authorization
from DSB to suspend concessions or other obligations with respect to India” based on “failure of India
to comply with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB”); see also Request for Consultation by the
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India’s export subsidies in India-Export Related Measures.7 Trade tensions
between the United States and India have continued to intensify. In May 2019,
the Trump administration suspended preferential treatment for India under the
Generalized System of Preferences program.8 India responded by imposing
tariffs on U.S. products, and the United States countered by filing a WTO
challenge to these new tariffs.9
Within existing scholarship on international trade law, there has been
significant debate over how much flexibility exists for domestic industrial
development policies, particularly in developing nations.10 One key shortcoming
within this body of scholarship has been the lack of precision in defining and
conceptualizing development policy space. Existing studies on international
trade law’s impact on development policy space have emphasized three main
approaches: legal approaches, institutional approaches, and compliance
approaches. 11 Legal approaches analyze how the relative flexibility of
international trade law rules impact policy space. Institutional approaches
analyze the extent to which developing nations have cultivated legal capacity to
expand policy autonomy. Compliance approaches examine patterns of state
compliance with international trade law rules and WTO disputes. However, I
argue that these existing approaches have paid insufficient attention to the
domestic context of policy implementation in response to WTO dispute
resolution.
This Article argues for a policy implementation approach to
development policy space that examines how key aspects of domestic policy
regimes shape available policy space for industrial development. The policy
United States, India-Certain Measures Related to Solar Cells and Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/1
(Feb. 6, 2013) [hereinafter Request for Consultation by the U.S., India-Solar Cells]. In September 2016,
India countered the U.S. challenge in India-Solar Cells by filing a request for consultations challenging
U.S. state and local renewable energy policies. See Request for Consultations by India, United States-
Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector, WTO Doc. WT/DS510/1 (Sept. 9, 2016).
In June 2017, a WTO Panel found that the challenged state renewable energy programs violated
international trade law rules that prohibited providing preferences to domestic products over foreign
products. See Panel Report, U.S.-Certain Measures Relating to the Renewable Energy Sector, WTO
Doc. WT/DS510/4 (June 27, 2019); see also USMovesWTOAccusing India of Violating 2016 Verdict on
Solar Power Programme, SCROLL.IN (Dec. 20, 2017), https://scroll.in/latest/862188/us-moves-wto-accusing-india-
of-violating-2016-verdict-on-solar-power-programme (discussingU.S. filing of request for authorization to suspend
concessions in response to India’s non-compliancewithDSB rulings in India Solar Cells dispute).
7 Request for Consultations by the United States, India-Export Related Measures, WTO Doc.
WT/DS541/1 (Mar. 19, 2018) [hereinafter Request for Consultations by the U.S., India-Export Related
Measures]. On October 31, 2019, the WTO Panel found that several of the challenged programs,
including the SEZ scheme, were prohibited export subsidies. See Panel Report, India-Export Related
Measures, WTO Doc. WT/DS541/R (Oct. 31, 2019).
8 United States will Terminate GSP Designation for India and Turkey, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE
REPRESENTATIVE (Mar. 4, 2019), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-
releases/2019/march/united-states-will-terminate-gsp; Amy Held, India Becomes Trump’s Latest Trade
Target, NPR (Mar. 5, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/03/05/700345593/india-becomes-trumps-latest-
trade-target.
9 U.S. Drags India to WTO for Imposing Additional Tariffs on 28 Goods, THE HINDU BUS. LINE (July 4,
2019), https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/world/us-drags-india-to-wto-over-duty-hike-on-28-
american-goods/article28287341.ece (discussing U.S. filing of request for consultations against Indian
tariffs on U.S. goods).
10 See infra Section II.A.
11 See infra Section II.B and II.C.
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implementation approach set forth in this Article examines how domestic
industrial policies and domestic constraints impact development policy space, by
examining three key factors: the underlying policy goals, tradeoffs, and available
policy alternatives in a policy regime; the size and position of the industrial
sector vis-à-vis sectors in other nations; and whether the regime is undergoing
major policy transition and change. This approach moves beyond analyzing legal
flexibility and deployment of litigation strategies at the WTO in order to analyze
the availability and viability of alternate WTO-compliant policy choices where
existing policies are ruled to violate international trade law rules and norms.
In advancing a policy implementation approach to development policy
space, the Article analyzes case studies of legal contestation and policy
implementation and adaptation in twoWTO disputes involving industrial policy:
India-Solar Cells, and India-Export Related Measures. In the India-Solar Cells
dispute, the United States challenged India’s inclusion of local content
requirements (LCRs) for solar cells in India’s National Solar mission program.12
In India-Export Related Measures, the United States filed a challenge to India’s
export subsidies, including its Special Economic Zones (SEZ) policy. 13 By
analyzing key aspects of domestic policy regimes in each of these disputes, I
highlight key differences in policy implementation and adaptation in each
dispute. I find that India has greater development policy space in the context of
export subsidies and SEZ policy than in solar industrial policy, and that this
difference is in large part to due to key differences in the nature and structure of
policy regimes governing each sector.
I selected these two disputes as case studies for four primary reasons.
First, these cases represent two contemporary, high-profile WTO disputes in
which a developed nation challenges a rapidly industrializing developing
nation’s industrial development policies. Both disputes are high profile in nature
given their global implications for the future of renewable energy and green
industrial policy and for manufacturing and global exports. Consequently, these
two cases allow for analyzing how governments have responded and adapted to
contemporary international trade law rules and WTO adjudication in the context
of two highly salient global issues.14
Second, both disputes involve examples of policies that have been key
components of India’s contemporary development strategy and are widely used
by other developing countries seeking to catch up with developed nations. LCRs
have been widely used by both developed and developing nations in renewable
energy policy, and developing countries including China and India have used
export subsidies programs like SEZs to promote growth in manufacturing and
12 Request for Consultation by the U.S., India-Solar Cells, supra note 6. India uses the term “domestic
content requirements” in its domestic policy documents, but the terms “local content requirements
(LCRs)” and “domestic content requirements (DCRs)” are both used by the WTO, and I use both terms
interchangeably in this article.
13 Request for Consultations by the U.S., India-Export Related Measures, supra note 7.
14 See Szu Ping Chan, Why India is One of the World’s Most Protectionist Countries, BBC (Apr. 11,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-47857583 (comparing BJP government’s international trade
policies to Congress government’s international trade policies).
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exports. As a result, both disputes have key implications for the study of
international trade law’s impact on development strategies globally.
Third, these case studies allow for comparison of national policy
responses in industrial sectors of different scope and size. The India-Solar Cells
dispute involves industrial policy in one industry, while the India-Export Related
Measures dispute involves industrial policies ranging across a broader range of
industrial sectors. This variation allows for examining how the nature and scope
of the regulated industries impacts the degree of available policy space.
Fourth, these disputes allow for comparison of how application of two
different sets of international trade law rules interact with domestic policy
regimes to impact development policy space: the India-Solar Cells dispute
involves the applicability of LCRs, while India-Export Related Measures
involves the applicability of rules governing export-contingent subsidies. As
illustrated by WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) rulings in both disputes,
the rules on LCRs are fairly strict and inflexible, while the rules governing
subsidies are somewhat more flexible given that the Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement requires proving multiple
elements in establishing the existence of subsidies, allows for certain types of
subsidies, and provides for certain exceptions for the use of subsidies including
export-contingent subsidies by developing nations. These two case studies
allow for examining how different sets of legal rules influence and shape legal,
institutional, and compliance strategies in response to WTO rulings.
The India-Solar Cells and the India-Export Related Measures disputes
demonstrate the limitations of legal, institutional, and compliance approaches. In
certain areas of international trade law, nations may not always be successful in
securing victories at the WTO DSB in securing favorable rulings and/or rule
changes, and there are limits to the “buying time” strategy that seeks to utilize
WTO dispute resolution to secure additional time for compliance. Finally,
compliance approaches that focus on whether nations do or do not comply with
international trade law rules and WTO decisions do not fully capture the nature
and scope of domestic policy regimes, the availability of policy alternatives, and
constraints, and challenges involved with policy implementation and adaptation.
Through case studies of the India-Solar Cells and India-Export Related
Measures disputes, this Article analyzes the obstacles and challenges faced by
the Indian government in pursuing WTO-compliant policies and strategies.
These case studies illustrate how international trade law rules and WTO dispute
resolution interact with domestic context to produce variation in policy space.
This Article makes three key contributions to the literature on
international trade law and development policy space. First, it highlights the
importance of looking beyond international trade law rules and WTO dispute
resolution to fully assess how the realities of domestic industrial policy
implementation impact development policy space. This includes analyzing the
interrelationship between international law and WTO dispute resolution and
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domestic policy regimes.15 A comparison of India’s policy response in India-
Solar Cells and India-Export Related Measures illustrates how international
trade law interacts with the domestic policy context in shaping the menu of
available and viable WTO-compliant policy alternatives. Second, this Article
bridges insights from existing scholarship on development and industrial policy
and international trade law and dispute resolution, by illustrating how a closer
understanding of domestic policy regimes can impact development policy space
and the efficacy of WTO dispute resolution. Third, by drawing closer attention
to the realities of domestic policy implementation, the Article suggests the need
for reformers to look beyond the realm of international trade law rules and WTO
dispute resolution to examine how structural aspects of domestic policy can
impact the success of trade policy and WTO dispute resolution.
Part I of this Article analyzes competing perspectives on the flexibility
of international trade law and theoretical approaches to development policy
space and advances a policy implementation approach to analyzing development
policy space. Part II provides a historical account of recent trends in industrial
policy and analyzes India’s legal and policy response to India-Solar Cells and
India-Export Related Measures. Part III compares India’s response to these two
disputes and draws insights on how key aspects of domestic industrial policy
regimes and policy implementation impacts policy space. Part IV concludes by
exploring implications of the policy implementation approach for policy space.
II. THE WTO AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY SPACE: THEORETICAL
PERSPECTIVES
The WTO fundamentally transformed the international trade law order
by introducing a new regime based on trade liberalization and a rule-based
system with strong dispute resolution mechanisms. 16 Since its inception,
scholars have debated whether the WTO’s free trade regime has been beneficial
for global trade and development policy space.17 The term “policy space” was
15 See, e.g., Terence C. Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders, in TRANSNATIONAL
LEGALORDERS 3, 11 (Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015) (defining a transnational legal
order as “a collection of formalized legal norms and associated organizations and actors that
authoritatively order the understanding and practice of law across national jurisdictions”) (emphasis
removed); Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, 12 ANN. REV. OF L. & SOC. SCI.
231 (2016) (discussing three approaches to theorizing transnational legal ordering that focus on: analysis
of private legal ordering; analyzing the interaction of lawmaking and practice at the transnational,
national, and local levels; and approaches that critique and reformulate transnational law by examining
non-state processes).
16 See ROLLAND, supra note 3, at 74-93 (discussing debates on development during Uruguay Round and
the extent to which the WTO has integrated development goals and interests of developing nations);
Alvaro Santos, Carving Out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the World Trade
Organization: The Experience of Brazil and Mexico, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 551, 556-557 (2012) (discussing
shift from GATT to WTO and attributes of the WTO regime).
17 See Santos, supra note 16, at 557-59 (discussing debates between free trade and development scholars
on desirability of WTO restrictions and implications for development) (citing JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN
DEFENSE OFGLOBALIZATION 60-67 (2004); MARTINWOLF, WHYGLOBALIZATIONWORKS (2004)). For
scholarship examining the impact of the WTO on development, see ROLLAND, supra note 3;
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THEWTO LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 3 (discussing how the WTO regime
has accommodated development goals and interests of developing nations).
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first used in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) documents in the early 2000s and was defined as the “scope for
domestic policies, especially in the areas of trade, investment and industrial
development” which might be “framed by international disciplines,
commitments and global market considerations.”18 Dani Rodrik has defined
development policy space as the autonomy of nations to pursue trade and
industrial policies needed to restructure and diversify economies in order to
benefit from globalization and foster economic growth.19 Rodrik argues that
developing nations require policy space to advance industrial policies that
address unique national priorities and development goals.20
Debates about the degree of policy space available to developing nations
intensified following the transition from the General Agreement on Trade and
Tariffs (GATT) regime to the WTO regime, following the adoption of the Single
Undertaking and the Uruguay Round. 21 Although the GATT agreements
codified principles of non-discrimination in the form of the most-favored-nation
(MFN) status, national treatment obligation, and reciprocity, the GATT
framework arguably offered greater policy flexibility for developing nations’
industrial policies and also was less aggressive in its enforcement of these free
trade norms against developing nations.22 Under GATT, some degree of policy
space for developing nations was effectuated through the incorporation of the
Special and Differential Treatment principle into the trading system via the
enactment of the Enabling Clause in 1979. 23 The inclusion of Special and
Differential Treatment was predicated on the belief that developing nations
needed to have flexibility and policy space to pursue policies that protected
infant industries from foreign competition while allowing for preferential access
to the markets of developed economies.24
18 Sheila Page, Policy Space: Are WTO Rules Preventing Development?, OVERSEASDEV. INST. 1 (Jan.
2007), https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/106.pdf (noting
that policy space was defined in Sao Paulo consensus as referring to “‘the scope for domestic policies,
especially in the areas of trade, investment and industrial development’ which might be ‘framed by
international disciplines, commitments and global market considerations’”); see also RODRIK, supra
note 3, at 13-14 (discussing conception of domestic policy space that focuses on national autonomy to
pursue development goals and objectives).
19 RODRIK, supra note 3, at 13-14 ; see also Dani Rodrik, Globalization Dilemmas & the Way Out, 47
INDIAN J. INDUS. REL. 393, 404 (2012) (arguing for a set of international economic law rules that
recognize that nations “have the right to protect their own social arrangements and institutions but not to
impose them on others” and arguing that “[t]he objective of international economic arrangements must
be to attain the maximum amount of integration or the maximum thickness in economic transactions that
are consistent with maintaining space for diversity in national institutions and the arrangements”).
20 See RODRIK, supra note 3, at 249-50 (discussing the need for international trade law regime to
accommodate unique national development strategies of developing nations).
21 See ROBERT E. HUDEC, DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THEGATT LEGAL SYSTEM 154-87 (1987)
(analyzing GATT’s relatively weak enforcement of non-discrimination and reciprocity norms against
development countries).
22 Id.; see also Alisa DiCaprio & Kevin P. Gallagher, The WTO and the Shrinking of Development
Space: How Big Is the Bite?, 7 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 781 (2006).
23 See Decision on Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, GATT Doc. L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT BISD (26th Supp.), at 203 (1980);
HUDEC, supra note 21; Bernard Hoekman, Operationalizing the Concept of Policy Space in the WTO:
Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 405 (2005).
24 See Hoekman, supra note 23.
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The establishment of the WTO in 1994 expanded the scope and
enforcement of regulations governing industrial policies, and when compared to
GATT, has arguably restricted the policy space available to developing countries
to pursue industrial policy and development strategies.25 Although the Doha
Round sought to prioritize development interests of developing countries,
subsequent rounds of negotiations and liberalization have failed to
fundamentally advance and address the goals of the Doha Development
Agenda.26 Early scholarship on international trade law and policy space in this
period emphasized how the transition from the GATT to the WTO ushered in a
new order imposing significant constraints on developing nations’ policy
space.27 In this section, I analyze competing perspectives on international trade
law’s impact on policy space and existing theoretical approaches for assessing
policy space in order to provide background and context for the article’s
proposed policy implementation approach.
A. Perspectives on International Trade Law and Policy Space
Scholars have offered competing assessments of international trade
law’s impact on development policy space. One group of scholars argue that
international trade law largely serves as a constraint on development policy space
and provides minimal flexibility for development policies. In his recent book,
Rodrik argues that the international trade law order in its current state has failed
to provide a more optimal balance between globalization and the development
interests of nation states.28 Rodrik and other scholars continue to argue that
international trade law provides insufficient policy space for developing nations
when it comes to industrial policies and that providing sufficient policy space is
crucial to allowing nations the flexibility to experiment with different types of
policies that work in different contexts.29 Other leading economists and scholars
including Ha-Joon Chang and Robert Wade have written about the importance
of policy space and how the international trade law regime has been guilty of
“kicking away the ladder” in not allowing developing countries the flexibility to
pursue development policies that developed and newly industrialized countries
have used successfully.30
25 Santos, supra note 16, at 564-69 (discussing ways in which the WTO restricts developing nations’
policy space as compared to the GATT regime); DiCaprio and Gallagher, supra note 22 (analyzing
changes in development space under WTO by examining national policy implementation and
compliance with WTO norms)..
26 See Tomer Broude, Development Disputes in International Trade, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT
PERSPECTIVE ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 32 (Yong-Shik Lee, Gary Horlick, Won-Mog Choi, and
Tomer Broude eds., 2011) (discussing different conceptions of development in international law);
Tomer Broude, The Rule(s) of Trade and the Rhetos of Development: Reflections on the Functional and
Aspirational Legitimacy of the WTO, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 221, 237-39 (2006) (discussing gap
between new emphasis on development in rhetorical discourse on trade law, and the lack of commitment
to effectuating develop in trade agreements and WTO institutional structures and mechanisms).
27 DiCaprio and Gallagher, supra note 22; Hoekman, supra note 23.
28 RODRIK, supra note 3.
29 Id.
30 See HA-JOON CHANG, BAD SAMARITANS: THEMYTH OF FREE TRADE AND THE SECRET HISTORY OF
CAPITALISM (2007) (highlighting how western developed economies used protectionist measures as part
of their industrial growth and development strategies); HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER:
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Another group of scholars has argued that international trade law does
provide some flexibility for developing nations to pursue industrial policies. For
example, Alice Amsden and Takashi Hikino have argued that the WTO’s “bark
is worse than its bite” and that international trade law still allows for policy
flexibility in the form of tariffs, trade restrictions for nations dealing with balance
of payments difficulties, antidumping and countervailing duties and safeguards,
and certain types of subsidies.31 Similarly, Sheila Page has also highlighted the
relative flexibility of certain international trade law provisions and how theWTO
has both simultaneously increased and decreased policy space in different
areas.32
In addition, scholars have highlighted the relative open-endedness and
flexibility of some aspects of international trade law that can be strategically used
and exploited by countries in WTO litigation in order to change and expand rule
interpretations in order to advance domestic industrial policies.33 Alvaro Santos
illustrates how nations have sought to extend time to “adjust to the rule” through
strategic use of WTO litigation, while Rachel Brewster has argued that the long
delays inherent in WTO adjudication create what she refers to as a “remedy
gap.” 34 While acknowledging that the WTO has restricted policy space for
developing countries, DiCaprio and Gallagher also suggest that the WTO and
international trade law allow countries the ability to gain additional time for non-
compliant policies through policy shifting strategies, including the use of
notifications, and simply waiting and refusing to withdraw WTO-inconsistent
measures until challenged in WTO adjudication.35
DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY INHISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2003) (discussing how international trade law
and the WTO have prohibited developing nations from the use of industrial development and trade
policies that previous nations had used to promote rapid domestic industrial manufacturing capacity).
31 See Santos supra note 16, at 561 (citing Alice Amsden & Takashi Hikino, The Bark is Worse Than the
Bite: New WTO Law and Late Industrialization, ANNALSAM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI (2000), and Alice
Amsden, Promoting Industry Under WTO Law, in PUTTINGDEVELOPMENT FIRST: THE IMPORTANCE OF
POLICY SPACE IN THEWTO AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS (Kevin P. Gallagher ed.,
2005) and arguing that international trade law under the WTO does provide for flexibility for industrial
development for developing nations).
32 See Page, supra note 18 (discussing areas where the WTO regime has both increased and decreased
policy space).
33 Santos, supra note 16, at 553-58 (2012) (discussing how developing nations can seek to exploit open-
endedness and flexibility in international trade law in trade law through strategic litigation in order to
expand policy autonomy in industrial policy).
34 See Santos, supra note 16, at 575 (discussing how nations can use delays in WTO litigation to extend
time period for adjusting its policies in compliance with the WTO Appellate Body’s rulings, and can
also use WTO adjudication to “test the boundaries of rules”); Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap:
Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade Law Enforcement, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 102 (2011)
(discussing how nations can take advantage of the extended time periods for compliance that result from
the protracted nature of WTO dispute by making slight changes and modifications to policies to buy
time).
35 DiCaprio & Gallagher, supra note 22, at 781, 798-800 (discussing use of notifications and strategy of
maintaining WTO-inconsistent measures until challenged in WTO adjudication).
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B. International Trade Law and Approaches to Conceptualizing
Policy Space
Within the literature on international trade law and policy space, there
are arguably three main approaches to conceptualizing how international trade
law restricts or impacts policy space. First, scholars have focused on the extent
to which variation in the flexibility of international trade law rules and WTO
rulings impacts development policy space. Second, scholars have advanced
institutional approaches that examine how nations have sought to develop and
utilize trade legal capacity in order to expand policy space for domestic
development policies. Finally, a third body of scholarship has focused on studies
of compliance with international trade law rules and WTO rulings in order to
assess policy space. In part, these different approaches reflect differences
between scholarship in different fields, including work by economists, social
scientists, and legal scholars. This section explores each of these approaches in
order to demonstrate how a policy implementation approach both supplements
and contributes to existing frameworks for assessing international trade law’s
impact on policy space.
1. Legal Approaches
One dominant approach to analyzing international trade law’s impact on
policy space focuses on the flexibility of the legal rules of international trade
law. A wide range of scholars have focused primarily on the actual text of
international trade law provisions in examining the relative flexibility of the
present WTO regime as compared to the GATT regime.36 As Santos argues, this
includes both structural and pragmatic development scholars who examine how
the flexibility of legal rules themselves affords nations policy flexibility.37 In
particular, scholars have highlighted how provisions of various international
agreements, including key provisions of GATT, the SCM Agreement, the Trade
Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) agreement, and the Trade Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) agreement all impact development policy
space. In addition, other scholars have focused on the uncertainty of legal rules
of international trade law. For example, scholars including Luca Rubini have
argued that because of its inconsistency, the existing subsidies framework does
not provide clear guidance and certainty with respect to key issues, including the
legality of state subsidies, and the use of LCRs in green industrial policy.38 This
uncertainty affects the policy space for green industrial policy at the national
level.39
36 See Santos, supra note 16, at 564-69 (discussing how WTO constraints national policy autonomy).
37 Id.
38 See Luca Rubini, Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, The SCM
Agreement, Policy Space, And Law Reform, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 525, 532-36, 543-48, 577 (2012)
(arguing that the status of renewable energy subsidies under international trade law is one of “significant
legal uncertainty” and “conflict between legal requirements and policy prescriptions,” and proposing
reforms that would provide explicit definitions for certain types of allowable renewable energy
subsidies).
39 See id.; see also Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional,
and Political Constraints, 98 AM. J. INT’L. L. 247 (2004).
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Another line of scholarship has emphasized the importance of legal
interpretation of international trade law rules. For example, many scholars have
focused on the nature of the analyses that international trade law allows for in
balancing trade versus environmental and human rights interests. International
law scholars have highlighted how international law can serve distinct interests
or goals, including human rights. However, as Rob Howse has argued, the WTO
dispute settlement system has been primarily grounded in a “statist
understanding of the nature of international trade law,” although some recent
cases have suggested a partial shift toward a “human centered” approach.40
While Howse and other scholars have highlighted how some WTO cases have
provided some deference to human rights and other environmental interests in
some of the “classic” environmental trade cases, they acknowledge that there are
still inherent limitations on the WTO’s ability to advance human rights and other
goals such as sustainability and development. Howse and Ruti Teitel have argued
for interpreting international trade law instruments in light of the International
Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which is part of the
normative environment of the international economic order according to the
Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission.41 In a separate
article, in the context of the India-Balance of Payments dispute, 42 Howse
discusses how the WTO failed to consider the applicability of a “right to
development” in adjudicating a challenge by the U.S. to India’s decision to
maintain quantitative import restrictions based on a balance of payments
rationale.43
Other recent scholarship has emphasized transformations in the WTO’s
jurisprudential approach to adjudicating disputes involving subsidies. For
example, Mark Wu and James Salzman have recently argued that the emerging
jurisprudence of renewable energy subsidies disputes represents a major shift
from earlier trade disputes involving environmental interests. Doctrinally, Wu
and Salzman argue that these disputes have involved a major shift in WTO
jurisprudence away from the “balancing” of goals of trade liberalization versus
environmental goals approach applied in earlier “classic” environmental trade
disputes like the Shrimp/Turtle case under Article XX of GATT 1994, toward a
strict liability approach in which the WTO simply assesses whether particular
40 See Robert Howse, Moving the WTO Forward - One Case at a Time, 42 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 223,
227-230 (2009) (contrasting the WTO judiciary’s “human centered” approach in its adjudication of
disputes involving nongovernment stake holders, with its more “state centered” approach).
41 Robert Howse & Ruti G. Teitel, Beyond the Divide: The Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and the World Trade Organization (Dialogue on Globalization Occasional Paper Series, Paper
No. 30, April 2007), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/global/04572.pdf (discussing how International
Covenant of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights can be used to guide interpretation of international
trade law rules and norms).
42 Report of the Appellate Body, India-Quantitative Restrictions on Imports of Agricultural, Textile and
Industrial Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS90/AB/R (1999).
43 See Robert Howse, Mainstreaming the Right to Development into the World Trade Organization,
in REALIZING THE RIGHT TODEVELOPMENT: ESSAYS IN COMMEMORATION OF 25 YEARS OF THE
UNITEDNATIONSDECLARATION ON THE RIGHT TODEVELOPMENT 249, 255 (Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights ed., 2013) (noting that the Appellate Body relied on a decision of the
International Monetary Fund that held that “India did not need to change its development policies
because it could address the consequences of removing its balance of payments-based import
restrictions through ‘macroeconomic’ policies.”).
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policies violate the SCM agreement.44 Because the SCM Agreement does not
contain exceptions or provide for balancing tests similar to GATT or the
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), Wu and Salzman argue that
next generation disputes do not allow for balancing trade versus environmental
interests.45 In more recent work, Wu has also highlighted how the WTO in its
interpretation and application of key aspects of the SCMAgreement, has in some
ways accommodated particular forms and structures of state capitalism in both
China and India.46While this research highlights how theWTO does analyze the
nature and structure of domestic policy economy structures in interpreting and
applying international trade law rules adjudication, it does not examine how the
underlying realities of domestic policy regimes constrain nations seeking to
respond to and adapt to WTO rulings through pursuit of WTO-compliant policy
alternatives.
2. Institutional Approaches
A second approach to analyzing international trade law’s impact on
policy space is the institutional approach. Institutional approaches analyze how
nations are able to strategically develop the capacity to use litigation in the WTO
DSB to expand policy space in the context of specific industrial policy disputes.
Although the institutional approach highlights how nations utilize and develop
legal capacity and legal strategies in WTO dispute resolution, this approach does
not fully explore how the nature and scope of domestic industrial policy regimes
shape legal strategies, and impact policy space based on the range of available
and viable WTO-compliant policy alternatives. One example of this approach
can be seen in recent work on how states foster and create developmental “legal
capacity” and have strategically used WTO litigation to expand rule
interpretations to advance domestic industrial policies within the WTO legal
framework. For example, Gregory Shaffer, Michelle Ratton Sanchez, and
Barbara Rosenberg illustrate how Brazil successfully developed and utilized
legal trade capacity in WTO dispute resolution by leveraging public-private
partnerships and coordination in order to gather information and to define and
advance Brazil’s interests in WTO negotiations and dispute settlement.47 In his
work comparing Brazil andMexico’s industrial and trade policies, Alvaro Santos
argues that developing nations, including Brazil, have successfully developed
and utilized legal trade capacity to effectively participate in WTO resolution to
push for favorable rules and decisions in order to provide for more development
44 Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and Environment Conflicts: The Rise of
Green Industrial Policy, 108 NW. L. REV. 401 (2014) (analyzing how international trade law
frameworks governing next generation green industrial disputes differ from first generation disputes).
45 Id., at 452 (arguing that in Next Generation disputes, “this balancing of trade and environmental
interests disappears” and “the applicable law effectively acts as a strict liability standard, requiring
adjudicators to find that so long as there is a violation of a trade obligation, the environmental policy is
illegal.”).
46 See Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 261,
301 (2016) (discussing the public body debate in WTO DSB disputes and the factors that should be
evaluated in determinations of whether state-owned enterprises are public bodies).
47 Gregory Shaffer, Michelle Ratton Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg, The Trials of Winning at the WTO:
What Lies Behind Brazil’s Success, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 383, 390, 423-54 (2008).
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policy space.48 In describing Brazil and Mexico’s trade strategies and approach
to legal strategy, Santos suggests a distinction between what he calls “free-trade
legal capacity” and “developmental legal capacity.”49
Santos critiques existing structural development and pragmatic
development scholarship for treating existing rules and exceptions as static, “as
if they imposed clear, fixed, and stable limits on states’ actions.”50 Instead, he
argues for a more dynamic approach that examines both the “rules in flux” and
institutional practices developed in the WTO in order to understand how states
can develop legal capacity to push for changes in rule interpretations that afford
states greater flexibility to pursue their developmental strategies. 51 Santos
suggests that developing nations have successfully expanded legal capacity to
push for rule changes in the long term and to buy time for “adjusting to the rule”
in the shorter term.52
Recent work on India has also analyzed how international trade law
norms have led to significant changes in developmental statism. Drawing on
Halliday and Shaffer’s theory of transnational legal ordering and existing
theories of developmental state trajectory, Shaffer, James Nedumpara and
Aseema Sinha have analyzed India’s development of legal trade capacity as a
response to its early losses in key WTO disputes including India-Quantitative
Restrictions and India-Patents. They describe the Indian state’s shift toward a
“new developmental state model involving a stronger emphasis on trade, greater
government transparency, and the development of public-private coordination
mechanisms in which the government plays a steering role.” 53 Shaffer,
Nedumpara and Sinha illustrate how the imperatives of WTO dispute resolution
have helped drive significant transformations in India’s developmental state
strategies. A policy implementation approach can help contribute to and
supplement existing institutional accounts by examining how the nature of
specific industrial policy regimes, the availability of policy alternatives, and
specific constraints and obstacles to policy adaptation also impacts the space
available for achieving industrial policy goals.
3. Compliance Approaches
A third approach to analyzing international trade law’s impact on policy
space focuses on actual compliance with international trade law norms and the
WTO decisions. For example, Alisa DiCaprio and Kevin Gallagher argue that
policy space should be measured by assessing actual policy implementation in
48 See Santos, supra note 16, at 594, 609-610.
49 Id.
50 Id., at 563.
51 Id.
52 Id., at 575.
53 See Gregory Shaffer, James Nedumpara & Aseema Sinha, State Transformation and the Role of
Lawyers: The WTO, India and Transnational Ordering, 49 LAW& SOC’Y REV. 595 (2015).
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response to international trade constraints and challenges to domestic policies.54
DiCaprio and Gallagher examine policy implementation by Newly Industrialized
Countries, including Trade Policy Reviews and other forms of WTO
notifications, as well as actual policy compliance in response to WTO dispute
resolution in order to assess the degree of policy flexibility available to NICs
following the transition from GATT to the WTO.55 Gregory Shaffer has also
examined the extent to which WTO dispute resolution forces nations to change
laws and regulations.56 Similarly, Kevin Gallagher has analyzed the extent to
which nations have adopted WTO-compliant policies including policies that
focus on improving infrastructure, tax concessions, and other incentives.57
Other examples of compliance approaches include comparative case
studies of compliance with WTO Panel disputes. For example, Kaoru Natsuda
and John Thoburn analyzed case studies of the development of the automobile
industry in Thailand and Malaysia in order to illustrate how each of these nations
have sought to carve out industrial policy space under international trade law.58
Santos also examines some aspects of domestic policy compliance in examining
both how nations use legal capacity and legal strategy to advance particular
development strategies, highlighting the interrelationship between participation
in WTO dispute resolution and domestic policy, but spends less time on
examining the nature of policy compliance and adaptation. 59 While these
compliance approaches do examine the extent to which nations actually comply
with WTO rulings, they do not fully capture how the realities of the domestic
policy context impacts policy space. The policy implementation approach can
complement compliance accounts by exploring how the nature and scope of
domestic policy regimes, the availability of policy alternatives, and constraints
and challenges involved with policy implementation and adaptation all impact
development policy space.
C. Conceptualizing Policy Space: Policy Implementation and
Policy Regimes
As illustrated above, there are several competing approaches for
assessing the WTO and international trade law’s impact on development policy
space and for conceptualizing policy space. However, I suggest that each of these
approaches fails to fully consider the importance of domestic policy
54 DiCaprio & Gallagher, supra note 22, at 781 (analyzing trade policy reviews, compliance with WTO
Panel disputes, and notifications and balance of payments applications to assess the degree of in
development policy space available to NICs).
55 Id.
56 Gregory Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes the Regulatory State, 9 REG. AND GOVERNANCE 1 (2015)
(discussing how WTO has forced changes in domestic law and regulations).
57 Kevin Gallagher, Understanding Developing Country Resistance to the Doha Round, 15 REV. INT’L
POL. ECON. 62, 82 (2008) (discussing nations’ adoption of alternate policies to comply with WTO
norms).
58 See Kaoru Natsuda & John Thomas Thoburn, How Much Policy Space Exists Under the WTO?: A
Comparative Study of the Automotive Industry in Thailand and Malaysia, 21 REV. INT’L. POL. ECON.
1346 (2014) (comparing how international trade law rules impacted industrial policy in Thailand and
Malaysia).
59 See Santos, supra note 15, at 594-99.
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implementation in assessing available policy space. In this section, I argue for a
policy implementation approach to assessing domestic policy space in key
sectors and suggest that this approach fills a key gap in the existing literature.
Santos has arguably gone the furthest in articulating a conception of
policy space that seeks to account for the influence of international trade law, the
assertion of trade legal capacity by nations at the WTO, and domestic policy
strategies. Santos defines policy autonomy as the “available regulatory space that
results from the combination of three factors: rule and doctrinal flexibility, legal
capacity, and development strategy.”60 Santos argues that policy autonomy is a
product of a nation’s ability to use its legal capacity to successfully seek rule
change or flexibility to accommodate its development strategy over the long term
and to buy time for “adjusting to the rule” through WTO dispute resolution.
Santos’ conception of policy autonomy is thus based on a dynamic institutional
understanding of the role of states and their ability to develop and deploy legal
capacity to achieve rule changes over time to advance the underlying goals of
their developmental strategies.61
In analyzing national compliance and policy implementation in order to
assess policy space, DiCaprio and Gallagher’s findings also highlight how
nations have been able to carve out “temporal” policy space by taking advantage
of the long time delays associated with WTO enforcement mechanisms and
WTO dispute resolution and compliance proceedings. Nations buy time for
compliance by strategically using notification and WTO adjudication. However,
like Santos, DiCaprio and Gallagher’s approach emphasizes the use of WTO
dispute resolution and other tactics to procure rule changes that accommodate
domestic policies and temporal strategies aimed at buying time for “adjusting to
the rule.”62While Santos, DiCaprio, and Gallagher highlight how nations can
carve out policy space through strategic use of WTO dispute resolution and
notification mechanisms, in certain cases, a nation’s active use of legal capacity
and other strategies may not guarantee policy flexibility. In disputes in which the
WTO DSB is unable to adopt a change in legal rules or interpretation, one must
analyze the nature of domestic policy regimes in order to ascertain the level of
policy flexibility in a particular sector.
I argue for moving beyond the legal, institutional, and compliance
approaches to fully assess the policy landscape of particular industrial policy
sectors. 63 In advancing a policy implementation approach to policy space,
60 Id., at 594.
61 Id., at 595.
62 See DiCaprio & Gallagher, supra note 22; Brewster, supra note 34.
63 As noted earlier, some scholars have sought to move beyond existing approaches to compliance to
assess how the WTO has impacted the regulatory state. See Vinod K. Agrawal & Simon J. Evenett, Do
WTO Rules Preclude Industrial Policy?, 16 BUS. POLIT. 481, 486-491 (2014) (reviewing existing
literature on WTO’s impact on policy space and highlighting how states adopt alternate policies in
response to WTO dispute resolution); Gregory Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes the Regulatory State, 9
REG. & GOVERNANCE 1 (2015) (discussing how WTO norms and WTO dispute settlement have forced
nations to change national law, legal practices, and administrative regulations in response to WTO
300 THEYALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 45: 2
I seek to bridge the gap between scholarship on industrial policy and
development and studies of WTO dispute resolution and compliance, by
focusing on how internal domestic policies and constraints impact development
policy space.64 This includes analysis of the underlying policy goals and policy
tradeoffs of a policy regime, the size and position of the industrial sector vis-à-
vis sectors in other nations, and whether the regime is undergoing major policy
transition and change.
As the case studies of India’s policy response to WTO challenges in
India-Solar Cells and India-Export Related Measures illustrate, variation across
each of these aspects of domestic policy regimes has a strong impact on industrial
policy space. In analyzing actual policy implementation and adaptation in this
article, I seek to move beyond assessment of legal flexibility andWTO strategies
in order to examine how India has sought to adopt alternative WTO-compliant
policy choices where existing policies are found to violate international trade
law. As both India-Solar Cells and the India-Export Related Measures disputes
illustrate, it is not always possible to succeed in immediately effecting rule
changes through WTO dispute resolution, and there are limits to the “buying
time” strategy to secure additional time for compliance.65 As such, this Article
focuses on how India has sought to navigate the process of policy
implementation and adaptation by exploring alternative WTO-compliant
policies and on the obstacles and challenges faced by the Indian government in
pursuing these alternate policies and strategies. As illustrated by these case
studies, assessing policy space available in these types of disputes requires a
closer analysis of a nation’s policy goals, tradeoffs, and the availability and
viability of alternate policies. In the next section, I analyze case studies of India’s
policy implementation in particular sectors to understand how international trade
law rules interact with the domestic context to produce variation in policy space.
III. INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN INDIA
A. Indian Industrial Policy: From Liberalization to the New
Industrial Policy
India’s policy responses to WTO challenges and its compliance with
WTO decisions must be understood in the broader context of significant shifts
rulings); cf. Robert Howse & Ruti Teitel, Beyond Compliance: Rethinking Why International Law
Really Matters, 1 GLOBAL POL’Y 127 (2010) (arguing that a strict focus on rule compliance is too
narrow and cannot adequately account for international law’s normative effects).
64 See Dani Rodrik, Industrial Policy for the Twenty-First Century (Sep. 2004) (unpublished
manuscript), https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/industrial-policy-twenty-first-
century.pdf (discussing the distinction between analysis of policy outcomes and policy processes in
industrial policy).
65 In distinguishing Brazil from Mexico, Santos suggests a binary dichotomy between states that use
legal capacity to advance developmental strategies (e.g. Brazil), and states with legal capacity but no
domestic development strategies (Mexico). See Santos, supra note 16, at 554-55. But there is arguably a
third category of cases: nations like India with strong legal capacity and coherent industrial development
strategies may still have limited policy room or flexibility in areas or sectors in which it is not possible
to effect rule changes through WTO dispute resolution, and where policy alternatives and adaption are
limited by state resources and the nature and size of an industrial sector.
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taking place in Indian industrial policy. India is now currently in the midst of a
significant transition in industrial and development policy under the current
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
India’s industrial policy has transitioned through several key phases, including
the transition from Mughal rule to British colonial rule and to an independent
nation. 66 In the 1950s, India’s industrial policy was based on democratic
socialism, developmental statism featuring centralized state planning, import
substitution industrialization, and protectionism.67 Under the leadership of Prime
Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, India announced a series of five-year plans in which
the state was charged with coordinating centralized planning to promote
industrialization.68 India’s early industrial policy was based on a developmental
statist model premised on state-owned enterprises, restrictions on exports and
imports, tariffs, and other forms of protectionism.
Under the governments of Indira Gandhi and Rahul Gandhi, India
shifted toward gradual liberalization of key sectors of the Indian economy, and
this process significantly accelerated in 1991 following the balance of payments
crisis. 69 In 1991, India entered a second phase of industrial policy as the
Congress government of P.V. Narasimha Rao ushered in new economic
liberalization and privatization policies in the 1990s. 70 Liberalization and
privatization accelerated through the 2000s under coalition governments led by
both the Congress and BJP parties. In 2019, India announced the development
and implementation of a New Industrial Policy, marking the third time India has
announced a major shift in industrial policy.71 The shift in India’s industrial
policy strategy reflects the BJP government’s economic agenda, but also reflects
how state institutions are responding to significant changes in the international
trade law regime and to domestic politics and domestic policy imperatives.
The New Industrial Policy includes a focus on boosting domestic
manufacturing and domestic employment, integrating the economy into global
supply chains, and attracting 100 billion USD foreign direct investment annually,
in line with the Make in India program’s goal of increasing the total share of
66 See ATUL KOHLI, STATE-DIRECTED DEVELOPMENT: POLITICAL POWER AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN
THE GLOBAL PERIPHERY 223-34, 247-55 (2004) (discussing history of colonial political economy and
state construction in India).
67 Id.
68 Early drafts of the new industrial policy call for new job creation initiatives, promoting foreign
technology transfer, and dramatically increasing annual foreign direct investment (FDI) by over 100




69 See FRANCINE FRANKEL, INDIA’S POLITICAL ECONOMY: 1947-2004 at 586-87 (2005) (discussing
gradual shift toward liberalization and privatizing in the 1980s under the Congress governments of
Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi).
70 Id., at 488-600 (discussing post-1991 macroeconomic reforms); SURESH TENDULKAR & T.A.
BHAVANI, UNDERSTANDING REFORMS: POST-1991 INDIA (2007) (discussing liberalization and
privatization reforms).
71 New Industrial Policy Linking Global Supply Chain on the Anvil: Suresh Prabhu, INDIAN EXPRESS
(Jan. 13, 2019), https://indianexpress.com/article/business/economy/new-industrial-policy-linking-
global-supply-chain-on-the-anvil-suresh-prabhu-5535808.
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manufacturing to 25 percent of the economy by 2020.72 The policy will also seek
to upgrade India’s infrastructure, reform restrictive labor laws, and reduce and
streamline business regulations and laws and dispute resolution mechanisms.73
In addition, the new policy framework is aimed at deregulating and streamlining
laws and regulations and will provide for “single-window clearances” at both the
central and state government level for industrial zones, easing of environmental
regulations and clearances, and self-certification for many processes, including
labor standards.74 The new policy will also include new incentives and reforms
to spur innovation, including simplification of the existing taxation system.75
B. India’s Earlier Approach to WTO Adjudication
In the transition fromGATT toWTO, India sought to retain some policy
space for subsidies and incentives. An example of this can be seen in its efforts
to maintain local content policies in the auto industry. Consistent with its
liberalization policies of the early 1990s, India gradually liberalized its
automobile manufacturing industry through the 1990s and early 2000s.76 During
this earlier era, there were arguably three major sets of economic reforms: the
post-1991 liberalization reforms, the adoption of transitional indigenization
(domestic content) and trade balancing policies in the mid-1990s, and the Auto
Policy of 2002.77 In the early 1990s, India adopted several key reforms, including
gradually delicensing key sectors of the auto industry, expanding allowances for
foreign direct investment up to 51 percent, and gradually relaxing restrictions on
capital imports and technology.78 As a larger number of foreign manufacturers
began to invest in automobile production in India (including through joint
ventures with Indian companies) during the early 1990s, India sought to harness
this influx of investment to stimulate the development of its auto component
industry.
During this transitional period, India conditioned the granting of certain
import licenses on both indigenization requirements (LCRs) and trade balancing
requirements in the automobile industry. As part of this broader policy approach,
the Indian government entered into a series of MOUs with individual automobile
manufacturers in 1995 and later issued Public Notice 60 in 1997, which
systematically imposed local content, trade balancing, and minimum investment
requirements on auto manufacturers seeking licenses to import Completely
72 Kirtikia Saneja, Ministry Sends New Industrial Policy for Cabinet Approval: Suresh Prabhu, THE




74 R. Suryamurthy, Easy Land in New Industrial Policy, THE TELEGRAPH (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://www.telegraphindia.com/business/easy-land-in-new-industry-policy/cid/1683655.
75 Id.
76 SeeMahipat Ranawat & Rasjnish Tiwari, Influence of Government Policies on Industry Development:
The Case of India’s Automotive Industry (Hamburg University of Technology (TUHH), Institute for
Technology and Innovation Management (TIM), Working Paper, No. 57, Mar. 2009),
https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/55450/1/594744865.pdf at 32-33.
77 Ranawat & Tiwari, supra note 76 at 45-46.
78 Id., at 45-47.
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Knocked Down/Semi Knocked Down (CKD/SKD) automobile kits. In 1998 and
1999, both the European Union and the U.S. challenged India’s local content and
trade balancing requirements in the India-Autos dispute at the WTO.
The WTO Panel ruled that these requirements were inconsistent with
provisions of the GATT agreement. Although India initially filed an appeal to
the Appellate Body, it ultimately withdrew its appeal. However, India was able
to take advantage of the long delays in the WTO dispute resolution process to
buy time for its LCRs in the automobile industry in the India-Autos dispute.79
India initiated its policies providing for indigenization and LCRs for import
licenses in the auto industry in 1995 and ultimately filed and withdrew its appeal
in 2002, a full seven years after it had initiated its policies. During this period,
India was able to use the LCRs to help stimulate the development and growth of
its domestic auto component manufacturing industry, and the value of output
from this sector increased from 2.4 billion USD in 1997 to 4.2 USD billion in
2001.80
As Shaffer, Nedumpara, and Sinha argue, India has worked to
strengthen and enhance WTO-related legal trade capacity to effectively
participate in WTO dispute resolution through expanding specialized
governmental bodies focused on trade, as well as forming public-private
partnerships that rely on private lawyers and the business sector for consulting
and advising on WTO litigation and compliance.81 Notably, India has had some
success in recent WTO disputes as a complainant.82 In EU-Generic Drugs, India
brought a successful challenge to EU policies allowing for seizure of Indian
generic drugs on patent infringement grounds during transit through the
Netherlands to other nations.83 And in US-Carbon Steel, India challenged the
U.S. imposition of countervailing measures on hot-rolled carbon steel products
from India and was able to gain a partial victory in terms of the WTO ruling on
79 See Gregory Shaffer et al, Equalizing Access to the WTO: How Indian Trade Lawyers Build State
Capacity, in THE INDIAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN THEAGE OFGLOBALIZATION: THE RISE OF THE
CORPORATE LEGAL SECTOR AND ITS IMPACT ON LAWYERS AND SOCIETY 640 (David B. Wilkins et al.
eds., 2017) (noting that “India lost this case as well, but, in practice, was able to use the dispute
settlement system to continue its requirements for a number of years to help develop local
manufacturing know-how and enhance competitiveness”).
80 UN DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMANDEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
AT A CROSSROADS: AID, TRADE, AND SECURITY IN ANUNEQUALWORLD 134 (2005) (citing John
Sutton, The Auto-Component Supply Chain in China and India: A Benchmarking Study, LONDON SCH.
OF ECON. AND POL. SCI (2004), http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/dps/ei/ei34.pdf; Meenu Tewari, Engaging the
New Global Interlocutors: Foreign Direct Investment and the Re-Shaping of local productive
Capabilities in Tamil Nadu’s Automotive Supply Sector, UNIV. OFN.C., CHAPELHILL (2003),
http://www.ids.ac.uk/ globalvaluechains/publications/AutoLoraine2003-FINAL.pdf) [hereinafter
“HUMANDEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005”].
81 Gregory Shaffer, James Nedumpara, and Aseema Sinha, State Transformation and the Role of
Lawyers: The WTO, India, and Transnational Ordering, 49 LAW& SOC’Y REV. 595, 607-615 (2015).
82 Rajeev Kher, India’s Trade Disputes: Implications for Public Policy, in WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
AT TWENTY: INSIDER’S REFLECTIONS ON INDIA’S PARTICIPATION (A. Das, and J.J. Nedumpara eds.,
2016) (discussing India’s recent success in WTO dispute resolution challenging U.S. and EU trade
policies).
83 Request for Consultations by India, EU and a Member State-Seizure of Generic Drugs in Transit,
WTO Doc. WT/DS408/1; Kher, supra note 82, at 28-29 (discussing EU-Generic Drugs dispute).
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the definition of a “public body” and ruling that India’s NMDC did not meet this
definition.84
However, as the next section illustrates, while this enhanced legal
capacity has enabled India to better advance its own development interests and
goals at the WTO in certain disputes, India still faces key constraints on policy
space in the context of WTO challenges to Indian industrial policies in which
India is a respondent. Here, I argue that policy space is also a product of key
aspects of domestic policy regimes, including the specific policy goals of policy
regimes, the viability of WTO-compliant policy alternatives, the status of
particular industrial sectors as compared to the global industry, and whether
particular policy regimes are part of broader industrial policy transitions.
Over the past five years, the United States has challenged a number of
India’s industrial policies as violative of WTO norms, including India’s LCRs in
solar industrial policy, and its export subsidies in SEZs. In the context of solar
industrial policy and SEZ policy, India is rapidly adapting and adopting new
policy compliance and adaption strategies in response toWTO dispute resolution
and ongoing negotiations. In the next sections, I compare India’s response to
WTO dispute resolution in India-Solar Cells and India-Export Related
Measures.
C. India-Solar Cells and Solar Industrial Policy
1. Policy Goals and Tradeoffs: India’s National SolarMission
India’s path to expanding solar generation capacity and solar industrial
manufacturing capacity began in the 2000s. The Congress Party government, led
by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, launched the Jawaharlal Nehru National
Solar Mission in 2010. Since its inception, the National Solar Mission (NSM)
has sought to advance two main policy goals: expanding India’s solar generation
capacity and stimulating the development of a domestic solar industry in India.85
The NSM set ambitious targets for solar generation capacity aiming for a
generation capacity of 20,000 MW of solar power by 2022.86 The NSM was
designed to replicate India’s success in using financial and fiscal incentive
programs to help stimulate and grow the wind energy sector in India in the
1990s. 87 The NSM consisted of several components: a long-term policy
framework, large scale deployment goals, investment in aggressive research and
84 Appellate Body Report, United States-Countervailing Measures on Certain Hot-rolled Carbon Steel
Flat Products from India, WT/DS436/AB/R (Dec. 8, 2014) (ruling that India’s NMDC was not a public
body under the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement, and that U.S. Department of
Commerce determination that NMDC was a public body violated SCM Agreement.)
85 Id., at 3.
86 See Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission: Towards Building SOLAR INDIA, MINISTRY OF
NATURAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/mission-document-JNNSM.pdf, at 3.
87 See Ashish Khanna & Luiz Barroso, Promoting Renewable Energy through Auctions: The Case of
India, LIVEWIRE, WORLD BANK GROUP (2014).
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development, and increasing domestic production of critical raw materials,
components, and products to achieve grid tariff parity by 2022.88
The NSM sought to deploy and expand solar energy generation through
the introduction of feed-in tariffs that provided preferential or favorable pricing
to solar power developers that enter into Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs)
with the government.89 A key policy component of the National Solar Mission’s
push to develop domestic solar manufacturing capacity was the inclusion of
LCRs for solar power developers entering into PPAs with the government.90
Under the NSM, these policies introduced feed-in tariffs providing preferential
pricing for developers entering into PPAs.91
Since coming to power in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s BJP
government has sought to dramatically expand the scope and goals of the
National Solar Mission. In 2015, Modi’s government dramatically increased the
NSM’s goals in announcing new policies aimed at the development of 100GW
of solar energy generation capacity by 2022, a five-fold increase in the original
goal set by the Congress government in 2010.92 The Central Government’s
national solar policies have been complemented by state solar policies. Gujarat
was the first state to launch state level solar policies in 2009, and many other
states have joined Gujarat in launching solar policies.93 At present, eighteen
states now have solar policies in place, and five states account for two-thirds of
India’s solar generation capacity: Gujarat, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan, Andhra
Pradesh, and Telangana.94
India’s Draft Solar Energy plan of 2016 further signaled the Modi
government’s desire to shift from fossil fuel to solar and renewable energy
generation, announcing that no new coal plants would be built beyond those that
were currently under construction.95 A major component of India’s push to
expand solar is tied to the Modi BJP Government’s broader “Make in India” and
88 Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission: Towards Building SOLAR INDIA, supra note 86. Under
the NSM, the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy of India (MNRE) is the central ministry
responsible for “all matters relating to renewable energy,” and is charged with setting forth the
guidelines and terms and conditions governing the three phases of the NSM.
89 See Gireesh Shrimali et al., Renewable Deployment in India: Financing Costs and Implications for
Policy, 62 ENERGY POL’Y, 28, 30 (2013) (discussing various aspects of renewable energy financing).
90 Panel Report, India-Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WTO Doc.
WT/DS456/R, ¶¶ 7.7-7.14.
91 Id., at ¶¶ 7.2, 7.7-7.9.
92 Id.
93 Nishant Rohankar et al., A Study of Existing Solar Power Policy Framework in India for Viability of
the Solar Projects Perspective, 56 RENEWABLE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV’S 510, 511 (2016)
(providing an overview of India’s current solar industrial policies).
94 Id.; Saurabh, These 5 States Host Two-Thirds Of India’s Solar Power Capacity, CLEAN TECHNICA
(Jan. 9, 2017), https://cleantechnica.com/2017/01/09/five-states-host-two-thirds-indias-solar-power-
capacity.
95 Rachel Cleetus, Renewable Energy Surges Globally with China and India in the Lead, UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS BLOG, http://blog.ucsusa.org/rachel-cleetus/renewable-energy-china-india
(citing Draft National Electricity Plan, CENTRAL ELECTRICALAUTHORITY, MINISTRY OF POWER
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, http://www.cea.nic.in/reports/committee/nep/nep_dec.pdf).
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“Invest India” strategies.96 These policy initiatives are aimed at increasing and
expanding India’s solar generation capacity and its domestic manufacturing
through attracting foreign investment to India.97
In terms of achieving its original targets for solar generation capacity,
the National Solar Mission has been highly successful, and India has seen
exponential increases in installed solar generation capacity. 98 By 2014, India had
added over 2.5 GW of capacity and achieved the 20 GW target by January 2018,
four years ahead of the original goal.99 However, there has been less progress in
developing India’s domestic solar manufacturing capacity. Despite India’s
success in expanding its solar PV energy generation capacity, India’s domestic
solar manufacturing industry is small, and in its nascent stages, and domestic
solar industrial manufacturing capacity remains limited. 100 India’s domestic
solar industry at present is limited primarily to the production of solar cells and
modules, and there is a lack of domestic production of thin-film PV cells.101
India’s solar industry lags far behind other countries in manufacturing capacity
and also lacks vertical integration. 102 As a result, India still imports
approximately 90 percent of solar cells primarily from China, Malaysia, and
Taiwan.103As Fickling argues, India lags behind other nations in part because of
India’s failure to adopt strong government subsidies and incentive programs
implemented in other nations, including China.104
2. The India-Solar Cells Dispute
India’s approach to adjusting and changing its policies in response to
the WTO’s ruling in India-Solar Cells illustrates both the nature of international
trade law’s constraining effects on development policy space and how nations
seek to adapt and operate within these constraints. In this section, I analyze both
India’s legal strategy in India-Solar Cells, and its policy response during the
implementation phase following the DSB’s adoption of the report in October
2016.
96 See Anil Gupta & Haiyan Wang, Make in India: Lessons from China, CNBC (June 21, 2016),
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/21/make-in-india-lessons-from-china.html.
97 Anindya Upadhyay, Modi Said to Plan $3.1 Billion Boost for India’s Solar Factories, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 17, 2016).
98 In 2016, alone, India added over 5GW of capacity and in 2017, India added over 9GW, leapfrogging
Japan to become the third largest solar PV market globally in terms of installed solar generation
capacity. Bridge to India Report, India Solar Handbook (May 2017) at 8,
http://www.bridgetoindia.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/BRIDGE-TO-INDIA_India-Solar-
Handbook_2017-1.pdf (discussing current trends in global and Indian solar policy).
99 Id.
100 SeeMeera Fickling, Solar Cells and Modules in India, in LOCAL CONTENT REQUIREMENTS: REPORT
ON A GLOBAL PROBLEM, 93-108 (Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al. eds., 2013) (discussing use of local content
requirements in renewable energy sector);.
101 Id.
102 Id., at 92-93.
103 Id.
104 See id., at 92 n. 92 (discussing use of subsidies, local content requirements, and export incentives in
the U.S., China, Brazil, and other nations); see Anshuman Sahoo & Gireesh Shrimali, The
Effectiveness of Domestic Content Criteria in India’s Solar Mission, 62 ENERGY POL’Y, 1470, 1471
(2013) (arguing LCRs were not likely to promote competitiveness of India’s solar PV sector).
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In India-Solar Cells, the United States filed a complaint in 2013 against
India’s imposition of certain DCRs on solar power developers who were selling
electricity to the government as part of the National Solar Mission under Phases
I and II of that mission.105 In 2016, the WTO Appellate Body affirmed the
Panel’s finding that India’s DCRs were inconsistent with national treatment
requirements of the TRIMs and GATT 1994 agreements and that they were not
covered under the government procurement derogation under Article III:8(a) of
GATT 1994.106 The Appellate Body’s decision followed its earlier ruling in
Canada-Renewable Energy, in which the WTO had previously held that
Ontario’s inclusion of DCRs also violated national treatment and non-
discrimination norms.107
Following the U.S. filing of the request for consultations in India-Solar
Cells, India did not halt its domestic content requirements (DCRs) but rather
extended and expanded these policy requirements as part of Phase II of the
NSM.108 Significantly, while the Commerce Ministry issued warnings about the
policies’ continuing noncompliance with international trade law norms, the
Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) remained undeterred in
continuing to extend and expand LCRs in order to continue to protect and foster
the nascent domestic solar manufacturing industry in India.109 However, the
Commerce Ministry continued to publicly defend India’s use of DCRs signaling
the need for policies aimed at promoting and developing India’s domestic
manufacturing capacity.110
India was able to buy some additional time for phasing out its DCRs
through vigorously defending its policies at both the Panel and Appellate Body
levels at the WTO. While the original request for consultations and complaint
was filed by the U.S. in 2013, the Panel did not issue its final until well into 2015,
105 See Request for Consultations, India-Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules,
WTO Doc. WT/DS456 (2013); Panel Report, India-Solar Cells, supra note 90, paras 7.8-7.9, 7.14. See
also Fickling, supra note 100. It is worth noting here that the National Solar Mission’s shift to LCRs for
even thin-film solar cells had significant implications for U.S. exports of thin-film cells to India, given
that U.S. companies exported a significant percentage of thin film cells to India. See US SOLAR ENERGY
TRADE ASSESSMENT 2011: TRADE FLOWS AND DOMESTIC CONTENT FOR SOLAR ENERGY-RELATED
GOODS AND SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, GTM RESEARCH STUDY (2011) (discussing U.S.-based
First Solar’s exports of thin-film cells to India and presence in the market).
106 Appellate Body Report, India-Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WTO
Doc. WT/DS456/AB/R (Sep. 16, 2016).
107 Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by India, Request for Establishment of a Panel, India-Certain
Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/20 (Jan. 19, 2018);
Appellate Body Reports, Canada-Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector,
Canada—Measures Relating to the Feed-in Tariff Program, WTO Doc. WT/DS412/AB/R,
WT/DS426/AB/R (adopted May 24, 2013).
108 Amiti Sen, Local Sourcing Mandatory in Phase II of Solar Projects, THE HINDU BUS. LINE (Oct. 20,
2013), https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/local-sourcing-mandatory-in-phase-ii-of-solar-
projects/article20678794.ece1.
109 Id. The MNRE’s willingness to press ahead with DCRs following the filing of the U.S. request for
consultations in India-Solar Cells can be contrasted from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry’s
proactive approach to immediately revise trade and export policies following the filing of the request for
consultations in India-Export Restrictions. See infra, Section III.C.
110 Kate Sheppard, U.S. Tries to Stop India’s Solar Policy While Pushing Fight Against Climate Change,
HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 28, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/india-us-solar-wto_n_5031345
(discussing Commerce Minister Anand Sharma’s public statements defending DCR policies in India).
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and the Appellate Body issued its final report in September 2016. In September
2016, India also immediately filed its own request for consultations in US-
Renewable Energy, challenging U.S. state and local renewable energy policies
incorporating DCRs. In June 2017, the WTO Panel found that these state and
local renewable energy programs violated national treatment and non-
discrimination norms under international trade law.111
After the DSB adopted the Appellate Body report in October 2016, India
announced it would implement the DSB’s recommendations and rulings, but that
it would require a reasonable period of time for implementation and compliance.
On June 16, 2017, India and the U.S. announced that they had agreed to a
reasonable period of time (RPT) for implementation of 14 months, and that this
RPT would expire on December 14, 2017.112 On December 14, 2017, India
circulated a status report to the WTO DSB Chairperson and informed the WTO
that after extensive stakeholder consultations, it had “ceased to impose any
measures as found inconsistent in the DSB’s findings and recommendations.”113
However, the U.S. continued to claim that India had failed to comply
with the Appellate Body’s report and recommendations and to bring its policies
into compliance with the WTO Appellate Body report within the agreed upon
RPT compliance period. On December 19, 2017, the U.S. requested
authorization from the DSB to impose retaliatory measures and suspend tariff
concessions pursuant to Article 22.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding
(DSU).114 On January 3, 2018, India objected to this request as invalid under on
the grounds that the U.S. had failed to initiate negotiations on compensation and
failed to identify specific elements of noncompliance or the proposed level of
suspension of concessions as required under Article 22.2 of the DSU.115 On
January 12, 2018, the DSB referred the matter to arbitration under Article 22.6.
In January 23, 2018, India filed a request for the establishment of a
compliance panel pursuant to Article 21.5 of the DSU. At the February 9 meeting
of the DSB, the U.S. objected to India’s request for a compliance panel, arguing
that it believed that the request signaled that India would continue to apply DCRs
111 See Panel Report, US-Renewable Energy Sector, supra note 6 (finding state and local renewable
energy programs in California, Washington, Minnesota, Michigan, Connecticut, and Delaware violate
Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 by providing preferential treatment for domestic products and less
favorable treatment for foreign products). The WTO’s decision could have significant implications for
future state and federal programs, including “Green New Deal” proposals at the federal level. See Todd
Tucker, There’s a Big New Headache for the Green New Deal, WASH. POST (June 28, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/06/28/theres-big-new-headache-green-new-deal/
(discussing implications of WTO Panel Report in US-Renewable Energy for Green New Deal
proposals).
112 Agreement Under Article 21.3(b) of the DSU, India-Certain Measures Related to Solar Cells and
Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/16 (June 16, 2017).
113 Status Report Regarding Implementation of the DSB Recommendations and Rulings by India, India-
Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WTO Doc. WT/DS456/17 (Dec. 14,
2017).
114 See India—Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WORLD TRADEORG.
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds456_e.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2020).
115 Id.
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in PPAs that India had entered into prior to December 2016.116 In addition, the
U.S. reserved its rights to seek DSB authorization to engage in countermeasures
while continuing to work with India toward a bilateral resolution. Finally, after
India reiterated its request for a compliance panel, the DSB agreed to establish a
compliance panel at its February 28, 2018 meeting.117
As noted in its request for a compliance panel, India acknowledged that
it continued to hold auctions for solar projects with DCRs during the pendency
of the WTO proceedings and litigation.118 India acknowledged that during the
pendency of the Panel and Appellate Body hearings, the MNRE continued to
issue guidelines for new projects with DCRs, issuing guidelines and request for
selection documents for the selection of: 3000 MW of solar projects under Phase
II, Batch II in March 2015; 2000 MW of solar projects under Phase II, Batch III
in August 2015; and over 5000 MW of solar projects under Phase II, Batch IV
in March 2016.119 Finally, India noted that seven new PPAs totaling 525 MW
capacity were entered into between March and December 2016, and that after
December 2016, India did not enter into any PPAs requiring DCRs that had been
ruled to be inconsistent with international trade law by the DSB’s
recommendations and rulings.120 Since the filing of the U.S .challenge in India-
Solar Cells, through the WTO DSB’s adoption of the Appellate Body report in
2016, India has seen a significant reduction in DCR tenders.
As part of Phase II, Batch 1 (2013-2014), the Solar Energy Corporation
of India tendered 750 MW, of which only half (375 MW) had DCR tenders.121
Under Phase II, Batch 2, DCR projects accounted for only 400 MW out of 3,000
MW tendered; under Phase II, Batch 3, DCR projects accounted for only 200
MW out of 2,510 MW tendered; and under Phase II, Batch 4, DCR projects
accounted for only 25 MW out of 225 MW tendered.122 Finally, under Phase II,
Batch 5, out of the 1,037.26 MW of solar tendered under the DCR category, only
696 MW were auctioned, and the NTPC was able to auction only 510 MW out
of 760 MW tendered under the DCR category.123
3. India’s Policy Response
In ruling that LCRs violate international trade law norms, theWTO took
away a central aspect of India’s solar industrial development strategy. Although
LCRs are generally disfavored because of their trade-distorting effects, LCRs
116 WTO Members Consider India’s Request for Compliance Panel in Dispute over Solar Cells, WORLD
TRADE ORG. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news18_e/dsb_09feb18_e.htm
(discussing DSB’s consideration of India’s request for compliance panel at February 9 meeting).
117 Panel Established to Determine India’s Compliance with Solar Power Ruling, WORLD TRADE ORG.





122 Raj Prabhu, Mercom Exclusive: Domestic Content Requirement Tenders Are All but Disappearing,
MERCOM INDIA (Apr. 25, 2017), https://mercomindia.com/mercom-exclusive-domestic-content-
requirement-tenders-disappearing/.
123 Id.
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can help stimulate growth in domestic manufacturing capacity by attracting
foreign investment, as illustrated by Ontario’s successful use of LCRs in its green
industrial policies, which were challenged in Canada-Renewable Energy, and by
India’s use of LCRs for auto components, which was challenged in India-
Autos.124 India’s domestic solar manufacturing capacity remains limited, and
India still heavily relies on imported solar cells and modules for domestic
projects.125
The WTO’s decision in India-Solar Cells has significantly affected the
policy space for solar industrial policies in India, as illustrated by the significant
shift in approach in new policies and programs. As a result of the WTO decision,
India’s MNRE was forced to cancel earlier projects, including a 250 MW tender
that had been awarded by the NTPC to Azure Power under the DCR category in
October 2017, one of the largest DCR projects awarded since the inception of
the NSM.126 In addition, the pace of India’s addition of new solar capacity has
slowed considerably, and India’s domestic solar industry is still struggling to
compete with foreign solar imports.127
Since the Appellate Body’s ruling, India has focused on implementing
several WTO-compliant policy alternatives that illustrate how policy viability,
political will, and complementary or conflicting goals, the nature of the industrial
sector, and the existence of broader policy transitions impact policy space.
India’s approach to adopting policy alternatives reflects the importance of the
availability and viability of WTO-compliant policy alternatives that are covered
under the government procurement derogation to the rules prohibiting LCRs and
the more flexible rules of the SCM Agreement’s subsidies regime. However, the
nature and state of India’s solar manufacturing industry, and the lack of a shift
to a new national industrial greatly affected the success of India’s policy
response and adaptation strategy in India-Solar Cells.
First, India has sought to continue using DCRs by expanding its
government procurement programs for solar energy, through the expansion of
the Central Public Sector Undertaking (CPSU) Scheme and other government
programs. In December 2017, the Indian government announced that it was
considering expanding the CPSU scheme from the existing 1 GW goal, to an
124 See HUMANDEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra 80, at 134 (citing John Sutton, “The Auto-
Component Supply Chain in China and India: A Benchmarking Study”); ENVIRONMENTALDEFENCE,
GETTING FIT, HOWONTARIO BECAMEA GREEN ENERGY LEADER ANDWHY ITNEEDS TO STAY THE
COURSE (2016).
125 India’s Import Dependence for Solar Equipment over 90 Per Cent in Last 3 Fiscal: Government,
ECON. TIMES (July 19, 2018), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/indias-
import-dependence-for-solar-equipment-over-90-per-cent-in-last-3-fiscal-
government/articleshow/65055838.cms.
126 Kaavya Chandrasekaran, NTPC Forced to Cancel 250 MW October 2017 Solar Auction, ECON.
TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/ntpc-forced-to-
cancel-250-mw-october-2017-solar-auction/articleshow/62422698.cms.
127 The Indian Parliament’s Standing Committee on Energy recently criticized the government for its
failure to achieve its yearly targets under the National Solar Mission by about 40 percent, by only
achieving 6166.15 MW out of the target of 10,000 MW of grid-connected solar power, with a utilization
of only 951.93 crore. The committee also noted the NSM’s rooftop solar targets, with only 953 MW
capacity installed out of the 40 GW target set for 2022.
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additional 12 GW goal, but there have been significant delays, and as of January
2019, the government had still failed to announce that it is implementing this
scheme.128 However, in recent months, the government has signaled greater
support for expanded investment in government procurement policies for solar,
and in January 2019, the Indian Railways announced plans to tender a 4 GW
solar project with domestic requirements. 129 On February 5, 2019, the
government announced that the Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs
(CCEA) chaired by Prime Minister Modi had finally approved the MNRE’s 12
GWCPSU scheme providing for the use of local content and allocated Rs. 8,580
crore (approximately 1.2 billion USD) to these projects to be built over a four-
year time frame.130
However, industry analysts have questioned whether the CPSU scheme
would be fully compliant with India-Solar Cells, given that many of these
CPSUs will not be able to consume all of the energy generated by solar
installations using local content. 131 For example, requiring the use of
domestically manufactured solar panels for use by the National Thermal Power
Corporation to generate auxiliary power to run coal plants may run afoul of
India-Solar Cells since the electricity that would be generated from coal plants
is sold to the public and not entirely consumed by the government.132
Second, India has been attempting to provide subsidies for domestic
solar manufacturers. This includes using the existing Modified Special Incentive
Package Scheme (M-SIPS), a capital subsidy program of the Ministry of
Electronics and Information Technology, which provides for capital subsidies of
20 percent for investments in SEZs and 25 percent in non-SEZs.133 Although the
M-SIPS program could provide billions in subsidies, it has two key limitations.
First, because of a lack of resources, there have been significant delays in
processing applications for these subsidies. Second, the program only provides
subsidies retrospectively through reimbursement of expenditures after the
completion of the manufacturing of facilities. As a result, participation in these
programs has been at relatively low levels, and the solar industry has sought
128 Kuwar Singh, 2018 Showed Why Import Duties Can’t Save India’s Solar-Panel Makers, QUARTZ
INDIA (Dec. 31, 2018), https://qz.com/india/1511463/safeguard-duties-didnt-help-indias-solar-sector-in-
2018/.
129 Indian Railways Plans to Tender 4 GW Solar Project, PVMAG. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.pv-
magazine.com/2019/01/17/indian-railways-plans-to-tender-4-gw-solar-project.
130 Press Info. Bureau, Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, CCEA Approves Proposal for Setting up
12,000 MW Grid-Connected Solar Photovoltaic (PV) Power Projects, GOV’T INDIAMINISTRY NEW&
RENEWABLE ENERGY (Feb. 5, 2019), http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=188139.
131 See Kuwar Singh, Why India’s Latest Push for Solar Panel Manufacturing May Not Be Strong
Enough, QUARTZ INDIA (Feb. 10, 2019), https://qz.com/india/1546930/why-indias-latest-push-for-solar-
panel-manufacturing-may-not-be-strong-enough.
132 Id.
133 National Solar Mission: An Appraisal, presented to Standing Committee on Energy (2016-2017), 16th
Lok Sabha, Twenty-Eight Report, GOV’T INDIAMINISTRY NEW& RENEWABLE ENERGY (July 2017);
Plamena Tisheva, India Explores Options After US Wins Dispute, RENEWABLES NOW (Sept. 19, 2016),
https://renewablesnow.com/news/india-explores-options-after-us-wins-wto-solar-dispute-540125/.
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upfront subsidies for its projects.134 Following the Appellate Body’s report in
2016, the MNRE proposed a wide-ranging set of subsidies and incentives worth
Rs. 20,000 crore (approximately 3 billion USD) to support the domestic solar
industry and allow it to survive and compete with the influx of cheaper imports
– especially Chinese solar imports – which rose 38 percent between 2016 and
2017.135 The Finance Ministry repeatedly rejected MNRE’s proposed subsidies
in June 2017, and also failed to include these subsidies in the 2018 and 2019
budgets.136
However, in the lead up to the 2019 Lok Sabha elections, the Modi
Government signaled a greater willingness to push for solar subsidies programs,
demonstrating the importance of political will for WTO-compliant policy
alternatives. In February 2019, the Modi Government announced a new massive
subsidy program worth Rs. 46,000 crore (6.48 billion USD) for both rooftop and
farmland solar programs.137 First, the new program allocates Rs. 11,814 crore
(1.6 billion in USD) to India’s rooftop solar program to provide subsidies to
group housing societies and resident welfare associations for the installation of
rooftop solar.138 The program has a goal of installing 40 GW of rooftop solar by
2022, which is 40 percent of India’s 100 GW solar target.139 Second, the new
policy allocates Rs. 34,422 crore (approximately 4.9 billion USD dollars) to the
Kisan Urja Suraksha Evam Utthan Mahaabhiyan (KUSUM) rural solar
scheme.140 The goal of KUSUM is to install 10 GW of decentralized ground-
mounted solar installations, grid-connected power plants and 1.75 million solar-
powered agriculture water pumps.141 Based on some estimates, the KUSUM
program may be able to surpass the 10 GW capacity goal significantly.142 In
addition, as part of reaching its overall goal of 100 GW by 2022, the Indian
government is now implementing policies that build utility scale installations
aimed at generating 60 GW of energy.143
134 Shreya Jai, Solar Manufacturing Schemes Face Hurdles over Subsidy, WTO Rules, BUSINESS
STANDARD (May 3, 2018), https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-s-two-
solar-manufacturing-policies-in-knots-118050301130_1.html.
135 Kaavya Chandrasekaran, Finance Ministry Rejects Rs 20,000-Crore Plan for Local Solar Equipment
Firms, ECON. TIMES (June 23, 2017),
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/finance-ministry-rejects-rs-20000-crore-
plan-for-local-solar-equipment-firms/articleshow/59276262.cms?from=mdr.
136 Id; Saumy Prateek, Budget 2018-2019: A Disappointing Budget for Solar and Renewable Energy
Sector, MERCOM INDIA (Feb. 1, 2018), https://mercomindia.com/budget-2018-19-india-renewable-
sector/; Saumy Prateek, Budget 2019 Fails to Meet Renewable Industry’s Expectations Again, MERCOM
INDIA (Feb. 1, 2019), https://mercomindia.com/budget-2019-fails-to-meet-expectation-renewable-
industry/.
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Third, India has attempted to protect India’s domestic solar
manufacturing industry through the imposition of safeguards and other duties on
solar imports. However, this strategy has highlighted the conflicting goals
between WTO-compliant policy alternatives and the original goals of the NSM.
In addition, these policies also highlight the importance of the nature of India’s
incipient solar manufacturing sector vis-à-vis other nations, and its reliance on
foreign nations for solar cells and modules. In December 2017, the Indian Solar
Manufacturing Association (ISMA) filed an application with the Directorate
General of Trade Remedies (part of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry)
seeking imposition of 95 percent safeguards on solar imports from China and
Malaysia.144 In July 2018, following findings that increased solar imports from
East Asia had caused or threaten to cause serious injury to domestic solar
producers, the Directorate General of Trade Remedies (DGTR) recommended
imposition of safeguards of 25 percent on solar imports, and shortly thereafter
the Ministry of Finance imposed a safeguard duty of 25 percent on solar imports
from both China and Malaysia that would gradually decrease to 15 percent over
the next two years.145 The imposition of these safeguards, along with other
factors, has led to a slowdown in the NSM’s achievement of its targets for solar
generation capacity, because of India’s heavy reliance on imported solar cells
and modules. Additionally, new solar imports from other countries, including
Vietnam and Thailand, have also posed challenges for the domestic solar
industry in India.146
Fourth, in response to the WTO Appellate Body’s decision in India-
Solar Cells, the Indian government has sought to stimulate domestic solar
manufacturing capacity by linking auctions for solar power PPAs to new
domestic manufacturing requirements, instead of DCRs. Beginning in January
2018, the MNRE, through its subdivision Solar Energy Corporation of India
(SECI), announced a new policy scheme wherein the government would issue
tenders for solar power with a local production requirement for successful
bidders, with the goal of increasing renewable energy production from 70 GW
to 225 GW in four years.147 Under this new scheme, solar power developers that
submit winning bids for auctions would be required to invest and develop
manufacturing facilities with the capacity to manufacture half of the overall
144 Ian Clover & Becky Beetz, India Mull Solar Cell Import Duty After Petition by Five Local
Manufacturers, PV MAG. (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.pv-magazine-india.com/2017/12/27/india-mulls-
solar-cell-import-duty-after-petition-by-five-local-manufacturers; Impose 95% Safeguard Duty on Solar
Cells Import: ISMA, DECCANHERALD (June 26, 2018),
https://www.deccanherald.com/business/impose-95-safeguard-duty-solar-677269.html.
145 Preeti Verma Lal, India Imposes 25% Safeguard Duty on Solar Imports, PV MAG. (July 31, 2018),
https://www.pv-magazine.com/2018/07/31/india-imposes-25-safeguard-duty-on-solar-imports/. The
DGTR also cited several reasons supporting the imposition of safeguards, including that the WTO’s
decision in India-Solar Cells was an “unforeseen development” and that the imposition of anti-dumping
duties by the US and EU against Chinese imports had led to Chinese companies significantly increasing
exports to India.
146 Anindhya Upadhyay, India Solar Duty Fails Domestic Producers as Demand Dwindles,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 29, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-29/india-solar-duty-
fails-domestic-producers-as-demand-languishes.
147 Sidhartha, Government Set to Seek 20 Gigawatt Solar Bids, Times India (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/government-set-to-seek-20-gigawatt-solar-
bids/articleshow/63966168.cms.
314 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 45: 2
equipment requirement.148 In May 2018, SECI issued tenders and conducted
auctions for a total of 10 GW aggregate capacity for solar power PPAs linked to
manufacturing requirements amounting to 5 GW aggregate capacity, though
SECI later lowered the manufacturing target in September 2018.149
However, these alternative policies have proven to be unsuccessful,
highlighting the conflict between the goals of expanding energy generation
capacity and expanding domestic solar manufacturing capacity. Since June 2018,
the SECI auctions have suffered numerous setbacks in the form of deferrals and
cancellations of bids and subsequent extensions of the deadlines for submitting
bids. In August 2018 alone, SECI cancelled allotment of 2,400 MW out of 3,000
MW that had been auctioned in July, cancelling all projects except a 600 MW
PPA with Acme Solar, the lowest bidder in the auction (Rs. 2.44 per unit).150
Although India has attempted to pursue alternate WTO-compliant measures to
support its domestic industry, the WTO’s decision in India-Solar Cells has
significantly constrained policy space and helped contribute to a short-term
decline in solar industrial installations. In addition, because India had not yet
undertaken a major shift in its broader industrial policies at the time of the
WTO’s Appellate Body ruling in India-Solar Cells, much of its policy response
was ad hoc and reactive. By taking away LCRs as one policy avenue, the WTO
forced India to pursue alternative policies aimed at building domestic solar
manufacturing capacity, but these approaches have been ineffective and have
arguably hindered progress toward the achievement of India’s ambitious solar
generation capacity goals.
D. India-Export Related Measures and India’s Special Economic
Zones Policy
In its request for consultations in India-Export Related Measures, the
U.S. brought a challenge to six key Indian programs, including India’s foreign
trade policy, SEZ policy, the Merchandise Export from India Scheme (MEIS),
the Export Promotion Capital Goods Scheme (EPCGS), the Duty Free Imports
for Exports Program, and the Export Oriented Units Scheme and certain sector
specific schemes, including the Electronic Hardware Technology Parks Scheme.
These policies include programs supporting India’s steel, pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, and textiles industries. In this section, I analyze India’s policy
response to the U.S. challenge in India-Export Related Measures by focusing
148 Id.
149 Originally, the scheme called for 5MW of manufacturing capacity, but this was later reduced to 3
MW. See Preeti Verma Lal, India’s SECI Defers 10 GW Solar Auction Again, PV MAG. (Sept. 28,
2018), https://www.pv-magazine.com/2018/09/28/indias-seci-defers-10-gw-solar-auction-again/
(discussing SECI decision to tender bids for 10GW of solar); Preeti Verma Lal, India’s SECI Reduces
Manufacturing Tender Size from 5 MW to 3 MW, PVMAG. (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.pv-magazine-
india.com/2018/09/03/seci-reduces-manufacturing-tender-size-from-5-gw-to-3-gw/ (discussing SECI
decision to reduce solar manufacturing tender size from 5 GW to 3 GW, and reduce minimum bid
capacity from 1 GW to 600 MW).
150 SECI Okays Lowest Solar Auction Bid, Cancels Rest, ECON. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://m.economictimes.com/industry/energy/power/except-for-acme-solar-energy-corporation-cancels-
all-projects-allotted-in-july-13-auction/articleshow/65249746.cms.
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primarily on India’s SEZ policies and its current approach to policy
implementation and adaptation.
The Indian government launched its SEZ policy in April 2000.151 The
primary goals of the original SEZ policy was to promote exports and foreign
investment in India by creating duty-free free trade zones supported by strong
infrastructure, economic incentives, and minimal regulations.152 In 2005, India’s
parliament enacted the Special Economic Zones Act and gave notice of the SEZ
rules in 2006, which provided for further streamlining of regulatory procedures
and single window clearance for matters involving central and state government
governments. 153 The primary goals of the SEZ Act included generation of
additional economic activity promotion of exports of goods and services,
promotion of investment from domestic and foreign sources (FDI), creation of
employment opportunities, and development of infrastructure facilities. Key
aspects of the SEZ Act and rules included eliminating licenses required for
importing, allowing for manufacturing and service activities in the zones, direct
and indirect tax benefits for SEZ developers, and the goal of achieving positive
net foreign exchange (NFE) for a period of five years from the start of
production.154
Among the most significant export-contingent incentives provided to
exporting companies under the SEZ policy framework are duty-free imports and
duty-free domestic procurement of inputs and capital goods for development,
operation and maintenance of EZ units, 100 percent income tax exemption on
export income for SEZ units under the Income Tax Act for the first 5 years, a 50
percent exemption thereafter, exemptions from Central and State sales taxes, and
single window clearance for Central and State Level regulatory approvals.155
Overall total subsidies to SEZs as of 2018 amounted to Rs. 3,657 crore
(approximately 517 million USD).
As of December 2018, there are seven Central Government SEZs and
eleven State or Private Sector SEZs, while government approvals have been
given to 420 proposals for SEZs in the country. Out of the 355 SEZs that have
been notified, 230 SEZs are operational.156 Significantly, most of the SEZs that
have been established under the SEZ Act and rules have been driven by private
investment. As of September 2018, the government reported that total exports
from SEZs were equivalent to a value of Rs. 333,000 crore (approximately 48
billion USD) and Rs. 492,312 crore (approximately 71 billion USD) of private
investment had been made, while over 19 lakh (1.9 million) jobs had been




154 Exports from SEZs at Rs. 3.33 Lakh Crore; Employment Generation at 19.96 Lakh Persons, GOV’T
INDIAMINISTRY COM. & INDUSTRY (Dec. 17, 2018),
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=186474.
155 Facilities and Incentives, Special Economic Zones in India, GOV’T INDIAMINISTRY COM. &
INDUSTRY, http://sezindia.nic.in/cms/facilities-and-incentives.php (last modified Nov. 27, 2018).
156 Id.
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created in SEZs. 157 The top five sectors in India’s SEZs in 2018 were
IT/ITES/electronic hardware/semiconductor, multi-product, engineering,
pharmaceuticals/chemicals, and textiles/apparel/wool.158
1. The U.S. Legal Challenge and the WTO: India-Export
Related Measures
In its request for consultations in India-Export Related Measures, the
U.S. argued that the SEZ policies, along with the Export Oriented Units Scheme,
MEIS, Export Promotion Capital Goods Scheme (EPCGS), and Duty-Free
Imports for Exporters programs all violate Articles 3.1(a) and 3.2 of the
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement’s (SCM Agreement)
prohibitions on export subsidies, because they provide for subsidies contingent
upon export performance.159 In particular, the U.S. argued that the SEZ policies’
direct and indirect tax incentives and other duty-free incentives violate the SCM
Agreement. Article 3 of the SCM Agreement prohibits the use of subsidies that
are contingent upon export performance (including subsidies listed in the
illustrative list of Annex I of the SCM Agreement). In addition, the SCM
Agreement also provides that “actionable” subsidies can be challenged through
WTO dispute resolution or countervailing measures if these subsidies cause
injury to the domestic industry of other WTO member nations.160 Annex I of the
SCM Agreement also specifically provides that direct or indirect exemptions or
remissions of taxes and duties in excess of those used for products for domestic
consumption are also prohibited.161 In its request for consultations, the U.S.
argued that India is no longer able to avail itself of the exemption from the SCM
Agreement’s prohibition on export subsidies for developing nations, because
India “graduated” from the Annexure VIII list of exempted nations when its per
capita GNP reached 1,000 USD per year for three consecutive years.
India raised several arguments in defending these policies at the WTO.
India argued that it should be allowed a phase-out period of eight years from the
point India crossed the graduation threshold, an argument India originally raised
in a note submitted to the WTO in 2011.162 India has based this argument on the
fact that developing nations that crossed the graduation threshold at the time the
SCM Agreement went into effect in 1994 were provided an eight-year
157 Id.




159 Request for Consultations by the US, India-Export Related Measures, supra note 7.
160 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, arts. 3.1, 3.2, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14 [hereinafter SCM
Agreement].
161 Id., annex I (e), (g), (h) (Illustrative List of Export Subsidies).
162 New Delhi to Seek 8 Years to Phase Out Export Subsidies at WTO, THE HINDU BUSINESS LINE (Mar.
15, 2018), https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/policy/new-delhi-to-seek-8-years-to-phase-
out-export-subsidies-at-wto/article23263660.ece.
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implementation period.163 On October 31, 2019, the WTO Panel found that the
challenged programs in India-Export Related Measures were prohibited export
contingent subsidies and rejected India’s claims that the challenged subsidies
were excluded from the SCM Agreement’s prohibition on export subsidies,
because India had “graduated” from its original developing country status under
the Special and Differential Treatment provision that it had originally fallen
under (Article 27.2(a) and Annex VII(b))), and found that most of the subsidies
programs challenged were prohibited export subsidies.164
2. Policy Compliance and Adaptation
India’s approach to responding to the U.S. challenge in India-Export
Related Measures has been quite different from the strategy and response to the
challenge in India-Solar Cells. India’s approach to policy response and
adaptation in India-Export Related Measures reflected greater policy viability,
political will, and complementarity between the goals of policy alternatives, and
the original goals of the SEZ regime. In addition, India’s policy response also
reflected the distinct nature of the industrial sectors in SEZs and the importance
of India’s broader shift to a new industrial policy.
While the government initially defended its programs and called for an
eight-year phase-out period at the WTO, the government also proactively
initiated consultations regarding changing its SEZ policies, along with its other
export subsidies programs including the MEIS program and Export Capital
Goods Promotion Schemes, to make them WTO compliant. The Indian
government has been working with public-private partnerships in order to
formulate a policy compliance and adaptation strategy well in advance of the
Panel adjudication in the WTO dispute.165
Shortly after the filing of the request for consultations in India-Export
Related Measures, the SEZ Division of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry
constituted a High-Level Committee consisting of numerous stakeholders to be
chaired by Baba Kalyani, the chairman and Managing Director of Bharat Forge,
one of India’s leading auto parts manufacturing companies, to analyze and make
recommendations regarding India’s SEZ policies.166 Other stakeholders on the
163 Id. On October 31, 2019, the WTO panel rejected India’s claims that the challenged subsidies were
excluded from the SCM Agreement’s prohibition on export subsidies because India had graduated from
the Special and Differential Treatment provision that it had originally fallen under (Article 27.2(a) and
Annex VII(b)), and found that most of the subsidies programs challenged were prohibited export
subsidies. See Panel Report, India-Export Related Measures, supra note 7.
164 Id.
165 This approach is in line with the findings of Shaffer, Nedumpara, and Sinha regarding India’s
continued and ongoing development of enhanced trade capacity and use of public-private partnerships.
See Shaffer, Nedumpara, and Sinha, supra note 53. It also can be compared to Shaffer, Sanchez, and
Rosenberg’s analysis of Brazil’s development of public-private partnerships and information gathering
to enhance its legal capacity. See Shaffer, Sanchez and Rosenberg, supra note 47.
166 REVITALIZING SEZS: FROM ISLANDS OF EXPORTS TO CATALYSTS OF ECONOMIC AND EMPLOYMENT
GROWTH, PROPOSED POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR EMPLOYMENT AND ECONOMIC ENCLAVES (3ES) IN
INDIA, Report of the Group Constituted under Chairmanship of Shri Baba Kalyani (Nov. 2018)
[hereinafter KALYANI REPORT].
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committee included industry leader representatives from key industries within
several SEZs, key officials from the SEZ division of the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry, and high-ranking officials from state-level departments of
industries and commerce. 167 The Ministry of Commerce and Industry also
retained PricewaterhouseCoopers as a “knowledge partner” to work with the
Kalyani Committee in developing and drafting its report. Part of the Kalyani
Committee’s charge was to explore alternate policies that were compliant with
the SCM Agreement’s rules on subsidies. The Kalyani Committee submitted its
report to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry on November 19, 2018, and the
report was released to the public for comment in mid-January 2019.
The report recommends a new SEZ policy framework aimed at
expanding domestic manufacturing and increasing employment.168 The Kalyani
Committee found that SEZs had been successful in promoting export growth in
the services sector, including Information Technology Enabling Services (ITES).
The ITES sector consists of companies that provide outsourcing of processes
through information technology (e.g., call centers) in areas including finance,
health care, and telecommunication. However, the report found that SEZs were
not successful in promoting export growth in the manufacturing sector, citing
several factors, among them: uncertainty in government policies, including tax
incentives; the lack of alignment between multiple regulatory stakeholders,
including direct tax and indirect tax entities, exchange controls, state
governments, and SEZ authorities; and procedural and infrastructure
bottlenecks.
The report recommends renaming SEZs as “Employment Economic
Enclaves” (EEEs) and shifting away from export-contingent policies that violate
the SCM Agreement, to new policies and incentives that promote jobs and
employment, expanding manufacturing capacity, and trade competitiveness. It
proposes delinking incentives from exports and instead suggests alternative
goals including: level of investment committed, job creation, inclusivity, value
addition, technology differentiation, trade potential, and emphasizing priority
industries.169
The report recommends several major policy reforms. First, it
recommends new and separate policies and rules for manufacturing and services
SEZs. For the manufacturing sector, the report calls for “moving away from
island of exports to more integrated hub for employment and economic activities
167 Representatives on the Kalyani Committee included Ravindra Sannareddy, CEO of SriCity, the
largest industrial park in South India (located near Chennai), K. Raheja Group, one of the largest real
estate and SEZ developers in India, and Ashish Mathur, the CEO of Tata Steel SEZ.
168 See generally, KALYANI REPORT, supra note 166; see Panel Report, India-Export Related Measures,
supra note 7. The Kalyani Report critiques India’s SEZ policy for its failure to significantly increase
India’s share of world exports as compared to China’s successful SEZ and export policies, which
increased China’s share of world exports from 6.7 percent of world exports in 2005 to 12.7 percent in
2017). The report observes that while India’s SEZ policy has been somewhat effective in expanding
India’s services industry and share of services exports, it has failed to significantly expand
manufacturing exports.
169 KALYANI REPORT, supra note 166, ¶ 1.2.1.
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enabled by quality infrastructure and ease of doing business.”170 Toward this
end, the committee’s report proposes a series of incentives based on employment
generation in the manufacturing sector instead of incentives tied to export
targets. Since the current SEZ policy provides for a sunset clause for export-
based incentives for manufacturing entities that expires inMarch 2020, the report
recommends that manufacturing units will not receive tax benefits after that date
and recommends the introduction of a new set of incentives tied to employment
generation benchmarks that would be WTO compliant. 171 The report also
recommends new policies aimed at building a world-class infrastructure with
access to ports, uninterrupted power supply, modern technology, skilled labor,
and more flexible labor laws.172
The report also calls for continuing existing policies and developing
new policies in the services sector, given that particular services—including the
IT and ITES sector—have been the major beneficiaries of India’s existing SEZ
policies.173 At the same time, because the SCM Agreement allows for export
subsidies in the services sector (as opposed to the manufacturing of goods), the
report suggests continuing the current SEZ policy framework’s incentives for
services, including extending the sunset clause for the services sector, and
broadening the definition of services and allowing multiple services to be
bundled together.174
In addition to supporting existing parts of the services sector where India
has a competitive advantage, the report also calls for diversifying the sectoral
focus to new “sunrise” services sectors through the Champion Services Sectors
Initiative. These new policies would be aimed at expanding employment
generation services in order to attract major global corporations to invest in
EEEs.175 Additionally, the report recommends: creating an online portal for new
investments and activities in SEZs; relaxing various procedural requirements for
SEZ developers related to operational and exit issues; introducing flexibility into
leases for SEZ developers and tenants; eliminating export duties on goods
supplied to developers for manufacturing of goods; and shifting to dispute
resolution through arbitration and commercial courts. Finally, the report also
proposes new incentives that focus on supporting micro-, small-, and medium-
sized enterprises (MSMEs) through MSME production clusters, given that
MSMEs are responsible for a significant percentage of job generation in India.176
The Central Government is currently formulating policy alternatives to
other policies challenged in India-Export Related Measures. Key cabinet
ministries have engaged in consultations with private expert committees to
formulateWTO-compliant alternatives to existing policies, demonstrating strong
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replacing the Export Capital Goods Promotion Scheme, which allows exporters
to import capital goods duty free, with a scheme that ties the duty-free import of
capital goods incentives to employment generation requirements. 177
Additionally, the Textile Ministry’s Cotton Textile Export Promotion Council
(Texprocil) has engaged a private consulting firm and is consulting with an
expert committee to formulate policy alternatives to the MEIS program, which
will also include a shift to incentives based on employment generation.178
The central government is currently finalizing a new SEZ policy
framework based on the recommendations of the Kalyani Report in line with the
New Industrial Policy, including a proposal to extend the sunset clause for tax
incentives for SEZ operators.179 Because of the distinct nature of the industries
that India is seeking to bolster and promote in SEZs, and India’s shift to a
comprehensive new industrial policy that aligns with shifting away from failing
policies to new WTO-compliant policy alternatives, the nature of the domestic
industrial context in India-Export Related Measures has helped contribute to
greater policy space.
Leading up to June 2019, the government rolled out key aspects of the
New Industrial Policy, India’s third industrial policy regime since
independence.180 The New Industrial Policy provides for a series of structural
reforms aimed at promoting industrial growth and increasing exports and job
creation in the manufacturing sector.181 Several key planks of the New Industrial
Policy were introduced as part of the Central Government’s July 2019 Budget,
including proposals to significantly increase government investment in
infrastructure; lift statutory limits on foreign investment in industries including
aviation, media, and insurance; expand credit and loans to small- and medium-
sized enterprises, and provide new incentives for emerging “sunrise” industries
including the electric vehicles and electric batteries sector.182
177 Amiti Sen, Government Mulls Duty-Free Import of Capital Goods to Skirt WTO, THE HINDU
BUSINESS LINE (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/economy/macro-economy/govt-
mulls-duty-free-import-of-capital-goods-to-skirt-wto/article24739154.ece.
178 Dilip Kumar Jha, Textile Ministry to Replace Export Incentives with WTO-Compatible Schemes,
BUSINESS STANDARD (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-
policy/textile-ministry-to-replace-export-incentives-with-wto-compatible-schemes-
118120400396_1.html.
179 Deepshikha Sikarwar, Talks on to Extend SEZ Sunset Clause, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (Sep. 24, 2019),
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/talks-on-to-extend-sez-sunset-
clause/articleshow/71283821.cms. Although the sunset clause expired on March 31, 2020, the Central
Government recently provided a three-month extension until June 30, 2020 for SEZ units that applied for
and received a Letter of Approval prior to March 31, and could not commence operations before March
31 because of the coronavirus pandemic. See Shilpa Phadnis, NASSCOM Asks for IT SEZ Tax Holiday
Extension, THE TIMES OF INDIA (Apr. 8, 2020), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-
business/it-sezs-seek-extension-of-tax-holiday/articleshow/75038810.cms.
180 New Industrial Policy to be Announced Soon, President Ram Nath Kovind, THE ECONOMIC TIMES
(June 20, 2019), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/policy/new-industrial-policy-to-be-announced-
soon-president-ram-nath-kovind/articleshow/69874073.cms?from=mdr.
181 Id.
182 Sitharaman’s Budget a Blueprint for Creating USD 5 trillion economy by 2025, BUSINESS TODAY
(July 5, 2019), https://www.businesstoday.in/top-story/sitharaman-5-trillion-economy-by-
2025/story/361971.html
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In addition, the government has enacted several other policies targeted
at SEZs. In June 2019, the government enacted a new amendment to the SEZ
Act allowing trusts to operate in SEZs by amending the definition of a “person”
in the Act to include trusts.183 The amendment seeks to expand domestic and
foreign investment in SEZs by allowing a wide range of entities, including public
charitable trusts, private corporate trusts, business trusts including real estate
investment trusts (REITs), infrastructure investment trusts (InvITs), and
government-run port trusts to operate units in SEZs.184 In September 2019, the
Central Government also announced new policies aimed at stimulating economic
growth in light of lagging export and economic growth indicators, including
policies impacting SEZs. First, the Government announced a major corporate tax
cut that would reduce corporate taxes to their lowest levels since India’s
independence in 1947, reducing the revenue from corporate tax by
approximately 20 billion USD. The new tax program reduces corporate tax rates
from 30 percent to 22 percent, and reduces tax rates on new manufacturing
companies from 25 percent to 15 percent.185 Second, the government announced
a set of WTO-compliant policies aimed at boosting exports.186 The government
introduced a new 7-billion-USD tax rebate policy, the Remission of Duties or
Taxes on Export Products, to replace the existing MEIS.187 The new policy
would refund central and state duties and levies on exporters operating within
SEZs. In addition, the government announced a new program to provide
exporters with cheaper and easier credit and loans under the Export Credit
Insurance Scheme.188
IV. COMPARING POLICY REGIMES: INDIA-SOLAR CELLS, INDIA-EXPORT
RELATEDMEASURES
Previous scholarship advancing legal and institutional approaches to
policy space have focused primarily on both legal flexibility and how nations
utilize legal capacity to advance development policy goals throughWTO dispute
resolution. As noted in Part I, Santos argues that policy autonomy is a product of
legal rule flexibility, legal capacity, and development strategy, and that nations
such as Brazil have successfully used WTO dispute resolution both to seek
extended time for challenged policies, and to push for rule changes and favorable
rulings that allow for more flexibility for development policy goals. 189
183 Bill to Allow Trusts to Set Up SEZ Units in Lok Sabha, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (June 25, 2019),
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/bill-to-allow-trusts-set-up-sez-units-in-lok-
sabha/articleshow/69935630.cms?from=mdr.
184 Prasanna Mohanty, SEZ Amendment Bill 2019: A Boost to Economic Activities and Employment,
BUSINESS TODAY (July 3, 2019), https://www.businesstoday.in/current/economy-politics/sez-
amendment-bill-2019-sepecial-economic-zones-boost-economic-activities-
employment/story/360856.html.
185 Rishi Iyengar, India slashes business taxes in bid to boost growth, CNN (Sept. 20, 2019),
https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/20/economy/india-corporate-tax-cut-sitharaman/index.html.
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Compliance scholars, including Dicaprio and Gallagher, have focused on legal
strategies for seeking additional compliance time, as well as actual policy
compliance.190 In this section, I analyze how the domestic policy context impacts
policy space by tracing the relationship between legal flexibility and domestic
policy regimes; comparing legal and compliance strategies in India-Solar Cells
and India-Export Related Measures; and comparing how different aspects of
India’s solar and SEZ policy regimes impact policy implementation and
adaptation to fully assess policy space.
A. Legal Flexibility and Domestic Policy Regimes
From the perspective of legal flexibility, there is a difference between
international trade law governing LCRs and subsidies. With respect to LCRs,
international trade law rules are inflexible and these requirements have been held
to violate the rules governing the national treatment obligation under Article III:4
of GATT 1994 together with the TRIMs Agreement’s prohibition on the use of
DCRs in WTO Disputes including Canada-Renewable Energy and India-Solar
Cells.191 Article III:4 of GATT 1994 sets forth the national treatment obligation
or principle, which requires that products of member nations “shall be accorded
treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national
origin,” and the national treatment obligation has been held to apply to internal
taxes as well as domestic regulatory measures.192 Articles 2 and 3 of the TRIMs
Agreement build on and incorporates Article III:4’s national treatment
obligation, GATT’s quantitative restrictions ban, and the various exceptions
contained in GATT, applying them to trade related investment measures.193 In
addition, the TRIMs Agreement also provides a list of illustrative measures that
are illegal in the Annex to the Agreement.194
International trade law does allow for derogations and exceptions to
these requirements. Article III:8(a) provides for a government procurement
derogation from Article II:4’s national treatment obligation and applies to “laws,
regulations or requirements governing the procurement by governmental
agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view
190 See DiCaprio and Gallagher, supra note 22; see Santos, supra note 16.
191 See generally TRIMs Agreement – Article 2/Illustrative List (Jurisprudence), WTO (Dec. 2019),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/publications_e/ai17_e/trims_art2_jur.pdf. The two key provisions
governing nondiscrimination under GATT are Article 1, which sets forth most-favored-nation (MFN)
principle, and Article 3, which sets forth the national treatment obligation. The MFN principle requires
that member states extend market concessions made regarding products in one nation to “like products”
of other member nations. See Understanding the WTO: Principles of the Trading System, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm (last visited Apr. 26. 2020) .
192 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187, 33 I.L.M. 1153 (1994)
[hereinafter GATT]; see Timothy Meyer, The World Trade Organization’s Role in Global Energy
Governance, in PALGRAVEHANDBOOK ON THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENERGY
(Thijs Van de Graaf et al. eds., 2016).
193 Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, arts. 2,3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186 [hereinafter TRIMs
Agreement]; see also Trade and Investment: Technical Information, Agreement on Trade Related
Investment Measures, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/invest_e/invest_info_e.htm (last
visited Apr. 26, 2020).
194 TRIMs Agreement, supra note 193, annex.
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to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for
commercial sale.” 195 In addition, Article XX of the GATT provides for
exceptions to the MFN and national treatment obligation principles for
environmental, health, and other state interests and goals.196
The relatively strict nature of international trade law rules on LCRs is
illustrated by the Panel and Appellate Body rulings in India-Solar Cells. The
Panel ruled for the U.S. and found that the LCRs in the NSM directly violated
the nondiscrimination obligations under GATT Articles III:4 and Article 2.1 of
the TRIMs agreement. Following the WTO AB’s earlier report in Canada-
Renewable Energy, the Panel found that the NSM’s LCR measures were not
covered under the government procurement derogation of Article III:8(a),
applying the competitive relationship standard applied by the Appellate Body in
Canada-Renewable Energy.197 After finding that India’s LCRmeasures were not
covered under the government procurement derogation, it then proceeded to
engage in a limited analysis of the other elements of Article III:8(a), and found
that the LCR measures were “laws, regulations, or requirements governing the
procurement of electricity” and also found that procurement of electricity under
the NSM constituted procurement “by governmental agencies.”198 However, the
Panel did not make findings in regard to whether the electricity procured under
the LCR measures was purchased “for governmental purposes” and “not with a
view to commercial resale.”199 The Appellate Body agreed with the Panel in
finding that India’s LCR measures were inconsistent with Articles III:4 of the
GAAT and Article 2.1 of the TRIMs Agreement and that the measures were not
covered by the Article III:8(a) government procurement derogation because the
electricity procured by the government through entering into Power Purchase
Agreements with solar power providers was not in a competitive relationship
with the product (solar cells) being discriminated against by the LCRs.200
With respect to subsidies, international trade law rules are arguably
more flexible, as they require proving more elements, provide for exceptions,
and allow a range of non-prohibited subsidies. However, as illustrated in the
WTO Panel report in India-Export Related Measures, international trade law
rules governing prohibited subsidies are stricter than those governing subsidies
generally, because they fall within a prohibited category of subsidies under the
SCM Agreement. The legal framework governing state subsidies under
international law draws on provisions contained in two agreements: the GATT
1994 and the SCM Agreement (a product of the Uruguay Round). Within the
195 GATT, supra note 192, art. 3.
196 Id., art. 20.
197 Panel Report, India-Certain Measures Relating to Solar Cells and Solar Modules, WTO Doc.
WT/DS456/R, ¶ 7.107 (Feb. 24, 2016).
198 Id., ¶ 7.151
199 Appellate Body Report, India-Solar Cells, supra note 106, ¶ 5.42 (citing Panel Report, ¶ ¶ 7.162,
7.186). The Panel Report’s approach can be contrasted with the approach of the Panel in Canada-
Renewable Energy, which did proceed to analyze each of these elements and found that Ontario’s DCR
measures were for commercial resale and therefore inconsistent with and not covered under the
government procurement derogation under Article III:8(a) of GATT.
200 Id., ¶ 5.40.
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category of actionable subsidies, the SCM sets forth the governing framework
for defining the substance and scope of prohibited, allowable, and actionable
subsidies.201 In contrast to the national treatment obligation and TRIMs based
claims, proving a subsidy under the SCM is difficult because of the complexity
of the SCM framework.202
The SCM Agreement requires that a challenging party establish that a
policy or program (1) meets the definition of a subsidy and (2) is specific.203
Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement sets forth the definition of a subsidy, and
provides that “a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if,” under 1.1(a)(1), “there is a
financial contribution by a government or a public body,” and, under 1.1(b), “a
benefit is . . . conferred.”204 Article 1.1(1)(a)(i)-(iii) also sets forth a list of
government actions that meet the definition, and in addition to financial
contributions, the provision includes other forms of direct transfers of funds,
including grants, loans, equity infusions, loan guarantees, tax credits, and
government provision of goods or services or purchases of goods.205 In addition,
Article 1.1(1)(a)(iv) also includes in the definition of subsidy actions by
governments, including payments to a funding mechanism and entrusting or
directing a private body to carry out the actions set forth above in Article
1.1(a)(a)(i)-(iii).206
After determining whether an action is a subsidy, a challenging party
must also establish that a subsidy is “specific” under Article 2 of the SCM in
order to be able to respond to a subsidy by imposing countervailing duties or
through the WTO dispute settlement process. 207 The SCM Agreement does
provide carve-outs, exemptions, transitional phase-out periods for developing
countries, and longer time extensions and transition periods for developing
nations. Additionally, the subsidies regime provides for more flexibility,
allowing for certain types of subsidies, and the SCM Agreement also applies to
goods, not services. Consequently, international trade law rules governing
subsidies do appear to offer room for other forms of WTO-compliant subsidies
as an alternative to export-contingent subsidies.
The rules governing export-contingent subsidies are somewhat stricter
than those governing other subsidies generally, as they are considered to be
prohibited subsidies. Article 3.1 of the SCM Agreement prohibits the use of
export-contingent subsidies—subsidies that are contingent in law or in fact on
export performance or on the use of domestic or imported goods.208 Article 3.2
of the SCM Agreement prohibits member nations from granting or maintaining
these subsidies.209 These subsidies are generally considered to be trade-distorting
201 SCM Agreement, supra note 160, Parts II, III and IV, arts. 3-8.
202 See generallyMeyer, supra note 192.
203 Id. (citing SCM Agreement, supra note 160, art. 1.1).
204 SCM Agreement, supra note 160, art. 1.1.
205 Id., art. 1.1(1)(a)(i)-(iii).
206 Id., art. 1.1(1)(a)(iv).
207 Id., art. 2
208 Id., art 3.1(a) and (b).
209 Id., art 3.2.
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and harmful, and are considered to be specific under the Agreement, obviating
the need for proving specificity.210 However, several aspects of the legal rules
governing export-contingent subsidies still suggest that there is still a degree of
flexibility for nations in this area of law.
First, the SCM Agreement still requires that a party must demonstrate
that the financial contribution and benefit elements are met.211 In the context of
tax incentives such as those present in India’s SEZ scheme, Article 1.1.(a)(1)(ii)
of the SCMAgreement provides for specific rules governing “revenue foregone”
and stipulates that a financial contribution in the form of revenue foregone exists
if “government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g.,
fiscal incentives such as tax credits).”212 In addition, Article 1.1(a)(1)(i) and (ii)
also set forth rules governing the analysis of benefit element of subsidies
analysis. In India-Export Related Measures, the WTO Panel analyzed two types
of financial contribution to assess whether they constituted benefits: foregoing
of revenue otherwise due, and the direct transfer of funds by the state to private
entities.213 Second, Footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement does stipulate that two
categories of activity are not considered to be export-contingent subsidies: “the
exemption of an exported product from the duties or taxes borne by the like
product when destined for domestic consumption” and “the remission of such
duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued.”214 Fourth,
the SCM Agreement does provide for some degree of flexibility in providing for
an exception to the prohibition on export-contingent subsidies for developing
nations that have not yet “graduated.”215
In the WTO Panel report ruling in India-Export Related Measures, the
WTO Panel ruled that most of the challenged programs did constitute prohibited
subsidies, finding that the United States had presented sufficient evidence that
the various programs (including the SEZ scheme, the Export Oriented Units and
Sector-Specific Schemes, the Export Promotion Capital Goods Scheme, the
Duty-Free Imports for Exporters Scheme, and the MEIS) were export-contingent
210 Trade Guide: WTO Subsidies Agreement, U.S. DEP’T OF COM. INT’L TRADEADMIN.,
https://www.trade.gov/trade-guide-wto-subsidies.
211 SCM Agreement, supra note 160, art 1.1 (a) and (b).
212 Panel Report, India-Export Related Measures, supra note 7, ¶ 7.297 (citing SCM Agreement, supra
note 160, art 1.1(a)(1)(ii)).
213 Id., ¶¶ 7.297 and 7.8 (citing SCM Agreement, supra note 160, art 1.1(a)(1)(ii)).
214 SCM Agreement, supra note 160, art.1.1(a)(1)(ii) n.1. The WTO panel in India-Export Related
Measures further noted that these categories contained four definitional elements that must be proven:
“there must be (1) an exemption or remission (2) of duties or taxes (3) on an exported product, (4) not in
excess of the duties and taxes which have accrued.” Panel Report, India-Export Related Measures,
supra note 7, ¶ 7.170.
215 Panel Report, India-Export Related Measures, supra note 7, ¶¶ 7.74-7.76.7.74. (“It is an undisputed
fact that India has graduated from Annex VII(b). The text of Article 27.2(b), in its context and in light of
the object and purpose of the SCM Agreement, leads us to conclude that the eight-year transition period
from the date of entry into force of the WTO Agreement set forth in Article 27.2(b) has expired on 1
January 2003, also for Members graduating from Annex VII(b). Therefore, we find that Article 27 no
longer excludes India from the application of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement.”)
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subsidies. 216 In addition, the Panel also found the challenged programs,
including the SEZ policies, were subsidies in that they constituted financial
contributions that also conferred a benefit under Article 1.1 of the SCM
Agreement.217 Furthermore, the Court held that none of the challenged programs
were covered by Footnote 1 of the SCM Agreement. Finally, the Panel found
that because India had reached the graduation threshold, it could no longer avail
itself of the exemption from the prohibition on export contingent subsidies for
developing nations.
As the next sections illustrate, these differences in the flexibility of legal
rules do influence and shape domestic policy space by affecting legal strategies
and constraining the scope of WTO-compliant policy alternatives that nations
can adopt in response to WTO challenges. However, in order to fully assess
policy space, one must look beyond legal strategies and WTO dispute resolution
to the realities of domestic policy implementation and adaptation.
B. Legal and Policy Compliance Strategies
India’s legal and policy response in India-Solar Cells and India-Export
Related Measures reflect distinct approaches to legal strategy and policy
compliance. The differences between the rules governing LCRs and subsidies
arguably played a role in shaping the legal strategies used by India in India-Solar
Cells and India-Export Related Measures. Because of the lack of flexibility of
the rules governing LCRs, India was forced to follow a reactive approach to
buying as much time as possible for its use of LCRs in the NSM and through the
DSU compliance proceedings. By contrast, because of the relative flexibility of
international trade law rules governing subsidies, India has mainly focused on
proactive compliance in attempting to change its policies governing SEZs and
other export subsidies programs well in advance of the Panel adjudication in
India-Export Related Measures.
In the India-Solar Cells dispute, India has pursued strategies in line with
the institutional approach through harnessing legal capacity in its strategic use
of litigation. Like its earlier approach in India-Autos, India’s legal strategy and
approach in India-Solar Cells were largely based on “buying time” for non-
compliant policies. 218 In response to challenges to LCRs in solar industrial
policy, India’s legal strategy was to vigorously defend its policies at the WTO
while buying additional time for such policies. As it had done earlier in India-
Autos, after losing at the WTO Panel and appellate body, India sought to delay
216 See id., ¶ 7.533 (finding that the challenged subsidies under the SEZ Scheme, including the
exemption from customs duties on imports into SEZ units, the exemption from IGST on imports into
SEZ units, and the deduction of export profits from the income of SEZ Units for purposes of corporate
income tax, are export contingent subsides). See also, id., ¶ 7.551 (pertaining to the MEIS), ¶ 7.542
(pertaining to portions of DFIS).
217 Id., ¶¶ 7.439-7.470.
218 As noted below, India has been publicly arguing for an eight-year extension on the SCM
Agreement’s prohibition on export subsidies following the attainment of the graduation threshold in
India-Export Related Measures, but has also aggressively sought to develop and formulate alternative
policies well in advance of the Panel adjudication in that dispute.
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enforcement of the WTO’s decision through ongoing negotiations with the U.S.
and successfully delayed the enforcement date until December 2017, more than
a year after theWTOAppellate Body’s decision in 2016. However, unlike India-
Autos, India’s buying time strategy in India-Solar Cells did not provide enough
time for the NSM’s LCRs to stimulate domestic manufacturing capacity, and
India still remains heavily dependent on foreign solar imports, which constitute
between 85 to 90 percent of solar cells and modules used in domestic
installations.219 The India-Solar Cells dispute illustrates the limitations of the
institutional approach. In order to fully analyze India’s policy response after it
lost in the Appellate Body and compliance proceedings, one must also examine
the domestic policy context to understand how India sought to adopt newWTO-
compliant policies in the solar industrial sector.
By contrast, the Indian government adopted a more proactive approach
to policy implementation and compliance in India-Export Related Measures, by
constituting special advisory committees and initiating the process of developing
and implementing alternate WTO-compliant policies far in advance of WTO
Panel adjudication. However, as illustrated in the next section, the India-Export
Related Measures dispute highlights the limitations of legal flexibility and
compliance approaches. While India’s anticipatory compliance strategy in this
dispute may have been influenced by the relative flexibility of subsidies rules
and a strategic assessment of available WTO-compliant policy alternatives, I
argue that this strategy was also shaped by the failings of India’s existing SEZ
policy and the significant transition that is taking place in India as part of the
adoption of a new industrial policy. In the next section, I suggest the need to
move beyond analyses of legal flexibility, institutional strategies, and
compliance approaches to examine key aspects of domestic industrial policy
regimes in order to fully assess available policy space in the solar and SEZ
sectors.
C. Policy Implementation and Adaptation
In order to fully assess differences in how policy space in the solar
industry and SEZs has been impacted by WTO dispute resolution in these two
disputes, one must also examine the actual nature of each of these policy regimes.
There are key differences in India’s approach to policy compliance and
adaptation in the two disputes that illustrate how differences in the nature of
domestic policy regimes in specific sectors affects policy space. India’s response
to WTO challenges to each of these policy regimes has varied based on policy
viability, political will, the conflicting versus complementary goals of WTO-
compliant policy alternatives, the actual scope and size of the domestic industrial
sector, and whether the particular industrial policy is undergoing a significant
policy transition.
219 See Kaavya Chandrasekaran, Global, Local Solar Manufacturers spar over Safeguard Duty, THE
ECONOMIC TIMES (June 26, 2018) https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/global-
local-solar-manufacturers-spar-over-safeguard-duty.
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1. Policy Viability, Political Will, and Conflicting Versus
Complementary Goals
India’s response to WTO challenges in India-Solar Cells and India-
Export Related Measures has been affected by three main factors that have
impacted the adoption of WTO-compliant policy alternatives: policy viability,
political will, and conflicting versus complementary goals. India’s solar
industrial policies and its SEZ policies have both arguably failed to achieve all
of their original goals, but India’s response to WTO challenges to each of these
policy regimes has varied based on the viability of alternative WTO-compliant
policy goals and internal policy tradeoffs that exist within each sectoral regime.
The Indian government has considered three main policy alternatives to LCRs:
direct subsidies, government procurement, and safeguards.
In terms of policy goals and tradeoffs, the WTO’s ruling in India-Solar
Cells has had a significant impact on India’s ability to achieve the key goals of
the NSM. As noted in Part II, NSM’s main goals included expanding India’s
solar generation capacity and promoting the development of domestic solar
manufacturing capacity. India has been able to rapidly expand its generation
capacity and surpass the original installation goals of the NSM. By utilizing
LCRs, India has sought to pursue LCRs as a second best alternative to domestic
subsidies in order to attract and leverage foreign direct investment in an attempt
to stimulate the domestic solar manufacturing industry. However, India has faced
challenges on the domestic manufacturing front. Given the relatively small size
of the sector, strong competition from foreign solar imports subsidized by China
and other foreign governments, and the lack of robust domestic subsides, India
has been unable to stimulate domestic manufacturing capacity, and arguably still
needed a longer time frame to achieve its domestic manufacturing capacity goals.
In adopting alternate policies aimed at boosting domestic
manufacturing, India has at least in the short-term undermined its first goal of
expanding solar capacity and has also still not been successful in stimulating
domestic manufacturing capacity due to the limitations of WTO-compliant
policy alternatives. India has been slow to adopt a robust subsidies program as
an alternative strategy until recently, and the Modi government recently
announced new programs for utility scale, rooftop and farmland solar subsidies
shortly before the start of India’s national elections in 2019. In addition, other
measures, including direct government procurement of solar energy (which
allows for the use of LCRs under the government procurement derogation) have
inherent limitations based both on the available financial resources and political
will for government expenditures on these programs, and the inherent limits on
how much electricity central and state government units can consume.
In addition to policy viability, the level of political will or support for
particular alternate policies can also affect policy space.220 India initially failed
220 See Santos, supra note 16, n. 28 (discussing and comparing Rodrik and Amsden and Hikino on
whether nations have “vision” to pursue policies that take advantage of flexibility in international trade
law rules).
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to adopt proposals for new direct subsidies programs to support the solar industry
because of resource constraints and opposition from the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry. However, just months before the 2019 elections, the Modi
government announced new large-scale subsidies for rooftop solar, farmland
solar, and utility scale solar projects, suggesting that electoral imperatives can
affect the political will for pursuing WTO-compliant policy alternatives.
India’s imposition of safeguards on foreign solar imports from China
and Malaysia has also undermined both of the main goals of the NSM, by
creating uncertainty about the price of solar inputs and by allowing for continued
imports from other nations including Vietnam and Thailand. Similarly, India’s
adoption of new manufacturing-linked solar tenders also faces key limitations.
Given the significant resources required for developing new manufacturing
plants and the increasing uncertainty caused by the imposition of safeguards, this
program has met with low levels of interest and participation from major
domestic solar power developers.
By contrast, India’s SEZ policies do not present the same conflicts
between goals, tradeoffs, and strategies. As noted in the Kalyani Report and other
studies of Indian SEZs, India’s existing SEZ policies have been largely
ineffective and unsuccessful in achieving the original goals of increasing exports,
employment, investment, and economic growth.221 The complementary nature
of existing policy goals within the SEZ regime (increasing exports and boosting
manufacturing) thus allows India greater policy flexibility when considering
adoption of WTO-compliant alternative policies.222 This distinction between
conflicting and complementary goals highlights a crucial difference between
India’s domestic policy regimes in the solar industry and SEZ policies. The
adoption of viable WTO-compliant policy alternatives in solar industrial policy
such as safeguards can arguably advance one goal (manufacturing) while
undermining a second goal (expanding installed solar energy generation
capacity) because of the impact of safeguards on the price of solar panels.
Because of the nature of the SEZ policy goals, WTO-compliant policy
alternatives in SEZ policy do not have similar implications for those goals. This
analysis of policy goals and tradeoffs can thus deepen our understanding of
domestic policy space. As a result, India has actually used the WTO challenge
to pivot and adopt alternate policies that are more likely to be successful in
promoting employment and expanding manufacturing and trade competitiveness
and that align better with the Make in India regime and India’s New Industrial
Policy. And because international trade law allows for greater flexibility for
subsidies and other forms of indirect support for industries, it appears that India
will have greater flexibility and policy space in this area going forward.
221 See KALYANI REPORT, supra note 166, ¶¶ 1.2-1.3, 4.4.3.1-4.4.3.2 (discussing weaknesses and
failures of India’s SEZ policy).
222 See KALYANI REPORT, supra note 166, ¶ 4.1 (recommending shift to WTO-compliant policies that
can increase employment, exports and growth in manufacturing and services).
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2. Nature and Scope of Industrial Sector
The state of an industrial sector can also significantly impact the
efficacy of the use of LCR policies to have an impact. As noted above, despite
the fact that LCRs were involved in both India-Autos and India-Solar Cells, India
had much more success in stimulating the development of manufacturing
capacity in the automobile parts industry than it did in its recent measures aimed
at the solar industry.223 In part, this reflects the relative status of the Indian auto
components industry vis-à-vis the India solar industry. Through investment and
key policy decisions of the 1980s, India already had developed the early stages
of an automobile industry and by the mid-1990s, already had developed a
growing auto components industry that could take advantage of LCR policies
and foreign investment. By contrast, India’s domestic solar manufacturing
industry and capacity were nascent and small at the inception of the NSM in
2010, and despite recent policy interventions, Indian companies have struggled
to compete with foreign solar imports from companies in China and East Asia.
India arguably needed more time for LCR policies to work, and it appears that
alternative WTO-compliant policies are unlikely to stimulate the domestic
industry in the near term.224 The actual size and development stage of a domestic
industrial sector are an important factor in assessing the probable success of
temporal “buy time” strategies aimed at extending compliance time horizons.
While the relatively small size of an industrial sector may affect the
efficacy of particular trade policies such as LCRs, it can also create opportunities
for policy transformations. India currently has a relatively small manufacturing
sector located within SEZs and as such, has faced less pressure to maintain
existing export subsidies programs within these zones. Consequently, key
leaders across different industrial sectors have been more willing to embrace new
and transformative policies aimed at investing in India’s weak domestic
infrastructure and to adopt new policies and incentives that aim to increase
employment and manufacturing growth through a more holistic set of policies
aimed at reducing regulatory restrictions on companies seeking to invest in
SEZs.225
In addition, the actual scope of particular industrial policies may also
impact development policy space. Industrial policies that focus on multiple
industrial sectors may offer nations more policy flexibility than policies that
focus on single industries. India’s SEZ policy differs from the solar industrial
context in that SEZ policy encompasses multiple potential industrial sectors.
Because of this important difference, India can explore several different policy
alternatives and strategies that seek to advance different and multiple industrial
223 See HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005, supra note 80, at 134 (citing John Sutton, The Auto-
Component Supply Chain in China and India: A Benchmarking Study, LONDON SCH. OF ECON. AND
POLITICAL SCI. (2004)); Tewari, supra note 80.
224 India’s lack of success in stimulating domestic solar manufacturing can be compared to the relative
success of Ontario’s use of local content requirements in its renewable energy policies (challenged in
the WTO in Canada-Renewable Energy) in attracting manufacturers and developers to stimulate the
domestic solar manufacturing industry. See ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENCE, supra note 124.
225See KALYANI REPORT, supra note 166, ¶¶ 1.2-1.3, 4.4.3.1-4.4.3.2.
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sectors. Following the recommendations of the Kalyani committee, the Indian
government is currently considering broadening its SEZ policies and framework
to include a broader range of industries and companies. 226 In addition to
expanding the scope of manufacturing industries housed in SEZs, the
government is considering opening up SEZs for other sectors including medical
tourism, financial services, and information technology.227
3. Transitions in Industrial Policy
Broader transitions in national industrial policy may also affect
development policy space. During the India-Solar Cells dispute, India’s solar
industrial policy was not part of a broader national industrial policy transition.228
The Modi BJP government did significantly increase the targets of solar energy
generation capacity under the NSM and also accelerated implementation of NSM
policies, allowing India to meet and surpass the original energy generation
targets. However, during the pendency of the WTO dispute, India was not yet in
the midst of a major industrial policy transition that significantly altered or
changed the nature and scope of solar industrial manufacturing policies. In fact,
much of India’s policy response in this case was ad hoc and reactive and
motivated by the BJP government’s re-election strategy in the 2019 national
elections. Consequently, the lack of a broader industrial policy transition
arguably diminished the effectiveness of India’s policy response and strategy in
India-Solar Cells.
By contrast, India-Export Related Measures illustrates how transitions
in industrial policy can impact policy space. India’s policy response in India-
Export Related Measures has strong parallels to India’s policy strategy in India-
Autos. Both policy approaches involve the development of industrial policies that
seek to take advantage of transitional periods in industrial policy. In India-Autos,
India utilized the pre-existing import restrictions regime to harness foreign
investment in auto manufacturing to stimulate the domestic auto components
manufacturing industry, through introduction of LCRs, as India transitioned
from a closed economy to liberalization policies in the early 1990s. In India-
Export Related Measures, the Indian government is arguably utilizing the WTO
challenge to help justify and support transformational changes in India’s SEZ
policies in line with the New Industrial Policy, and SEZs are a central component
226 Kirtika Suneja, New SEZ Policy Bats for Easy Exits and Flexibility in Leases, THE ECONOMIC TIMES,
(May 26, 2019), available at https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/new-sez-
policy-bats-for-easy-exits-and-flexibility-in-leases/articleshow/69509265.cms.
227 Id.
228 It should be noted that the Central Government did launch the early phases of Prime Minister
Narendra Modi’s “Make in India” strategy in 2014 to attract expanded foreign direct investment into
domestic manufacturing in India. However, this policy did not lead to immediate and significant shifts
in domestic solar industrial and manufacturing policy. In 2017, the Central government announced it
was planning to launch a New Industrial Policy aimed at making transformative changes in domestic
industrial policy, boosting industrial growth and fostering creation of manufacturing jobs. Following its
victory and re-election in the May 2019 national elections, Modi’s BJP government released several key
aspects of the New Industrial Policy as part of the July 2019 budget. See Sitharaman’s Budget a
Blueprint for Creating USD 5 trillion economy by 2025: India Inc., BUSINESS TODAY (July 5, 2019),
https://www.businesstoday.in/top-story/sitharaman-5-trillion-economy-by-2025/story/361971.html.
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of this broader national industrial policy transition. In addition, India can also
use the likelihood of the WTO finding that the SEZ and other export subsidies
violate international trade law to attract foreign investment in the near term.
Foreign companies are likely to consider investing in Indian SEZs during the
current transitional period in India’s industrial policy, to take advantage of
existing incentives for export subsidies (e.g., the sunset clause for SEZ tax
incentives) before they are phased out. 229 India-Export Related Measures
illustrates the importance of major national industrial policy transitions for
development policy space. The launch of the New Industrial Policy has enabled
India to rapidly pivot away from non-compliant policies, to WTO-compliant
policies that could dramatically boost exports and domestic manufacturing. By
contrast, the lack of an industrial policy transition during India’s response to
India-Solar Cells limited the possibility of success of newly adopted policy
alternatives, as these polices were ad hoc and reactive and not part of a
comprehensive shift in industrial policy.
V. CONCLUSION
India adopted two distinct approaches to policy implementation and
adaptation in India-Solar Cells and India-Export Related Measures. In India-
Solar Cells, India adopted a “reactive” buy time institutional strategy and only
adopted policy compliance and adaptation after losing at the WTO, while in
India-Export Related Measures, India adopted an anticipatory compliance and
adaptation strategy. These distinct strategies were shaped not only by differences
in the legal flexibility of international trade law rules and WTO decisions, but
also by fundamental differences in the policy regimes in each of the sectors.
Although legal capacity and legal strategy can be utilized by developing nations
to expand long-term policy autonomy, the policy space available to nations in
individual industrial and policy sectors is also a product of the nature of domestic
policy regimes.
The two case studies analyzed in this article illustrate how policy space
in particular sectors is impacted by legal flexibility and effective legal strategy,
as well as by the realities of domestic policy regimes and viability of pursuing
WTO-compliant policy alternatives to achieve development goals. The India-
Solar Cells dispute illustrated how DCRs can complement the Modi-BJP
government’s new “Make in India”230 and “Invest India” programs, which are
aimed at inviting foreign investment by foreign corporations to manufacture in
India and use domestic content in their manufacturing. DCRs can help
“bootstrap” or stimulate domestic manufacturing by requiring foreign or
229 For example, Apple and FoxConn are currently considering making investments in iPhone
manufacturing plants in Indian SEZs, and a U.S. based pharmaceutical is currently considering investing
in new manufacturing plants in SEZs. See Bharani Vaitheesvaran, FoxConn plans plant expansion to
manufacture iPhones from Tamil Nadu, ECONOMIC TIMES (Dec. 27, 2018),
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/tech/hardware/foxconn-may-begin-assembling-top-end-apple-
iphones-in-india-in-2019/articleshow/67270909.cms; NY Firm May Invest Rs. 400 in SEZ, TIMES OF
INDIA (Jan. 17, 2019), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/indore/ny-firm-may-invest-400cr-in-
sez/articleshow/67563819.cms.
230 See Gupta & Wang, supra note 96.
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Related Measures dispute illustrates how transitions in industrial policy can also
afford greater policy space, by creating incentives for private corporations to take
advantage of older incentives that will be phased out over certain time periods.
The Indian case illustrates the need to not only examine legal and institutional
approaches to policy space, but also focus on policy implementation and
adaptation in order to understand how the realities of the domestic policy context
affect domestic policy space.
An analysis of India’s approach to policy implementation and adaptation in
response to India-Solar Cells and India-Export RelatedMeasures highlights how
the architecture of domestic policy regimes can have significant impacts on
development policy space. In doing so, this article advances an approach which
bridges different approaches for assessing policy space, and makes an important
contribution to existing scholarship on the impact of transnational legal ordering
on domestic legal and governance structures.234 and on studies of international
law compliance.235 In addition, by focusing greater attention on the realities of
domestic policy implementation, this study also has important implications for
reformers seeking to align international trade law norms and instruments with
the reality of the development goals and interests of developing nations. Rather
than focusing exclusively on legal norms and WTO dispute resolution, this
article suggests that scholars and reformers should also examine how structural
aspects of domestic policy implementation can impact the relative success of key
industrial policies and WTO dispute resolution involving those policies.
234 See, e.g., Halliday and Shaffer, supra note 15.
235 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, HOWNATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2nd ed. 1979);
Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1823 (2002);
Harold Hongju Koh,Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE. L.J. 2599 (1997).
